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EDITOR’S NOTE

It is my great pleasure to welcome you to the sixth edition of *Quaestio*, the annual undergraduate history journal produced by the Theta Upsilon chapter of Phi Alpha Theta National History Honor Society at UCLA. I am most humbled to have overseen the compilation and publication of *Quaestio* this year; my distinguished peers’ works are nothing short of enlightening.

I am often asked about the title of our journal. Why *Quaestio*? *Quaestio* is the Latin word for ‘inquiry.’ This title is an apt representation of what our publication is all about: history, not as a story well told, but rather as a story well scrutinized.

In my brief message to you, I should like — in the style of my esteemed mentor, Professor Teofilo F. Ruiz of UCLA’s Department of History — to invoke Walter Benjamin. In his essay, entitled “Theses on the Philosophy of History” (1940), Benjamin presents a critique of historicism. According to Benjamin, historicism depicts the “eternal picture of the past” (Thesis XVI). He argues against the idea of an “eternal picture” of history and posits that history is about “seiz[ing] hold of a [distinct] memory as it flashes up at a [distinct] moment of danger” (Thesis VI). Moreover, Benjamin rejects the idea of the past as a continuum of progress (Thesis XI) and employs Paul
Klee’s painting *Angeles Novus* (1920) to explain his view of so-called progress (Thesis IX):

...[Angleus Novus] shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe, which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.¹


Image courtesy of The Israel Museum, Jerusalem, Israel/Carole and Ronald Lauder, New York/The Bridgeman Art Library
He explicates, “There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarity.”

Walter Benjamin insists that it is the historian’s task to be critical of ‘progress,’ to “brush history against the grain.”² *Quaestio* insists that it is the historian’s responsibility to do so.

The exemplary pieces of scholarship contained in these pages were selected for publication because they take Benjamin’s critical and scrutinizing approach to the study of history, and in so doing, capture the very meaning of *Quaestio*.

The compilation and publication of this journal would not have been possible were it not for the collaborative effort of a number of truly talented and tireless fellow undergraduate history enthusiasts. I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincerest gratitude to the editorial board — Stephanie Dyar, Alan Naroditsy, Tessa Nath, Serena Wu, and Lee Corkett. I would also like to commend Sohaib Baig, Zoë Rose Buonaiuto, Maneesh Karna, Ethan Scapellati, and Benjamin Steiner for their excellent scholarship. To Professor David N. Myers, Chair of the History Department, and Professor Joan Waugh, Vice-Chair of the History Department, thank you for your steadfast support of Phi Alpha Theta and *Quaestio* and for being so dedicated to the enrichment of the undergraduate experience. To Paul Padilla, Undergraduate Departmental Advisor, thank you for all your

² Benjamin, 256.
invaluable guidance. Finally, on behalf of the editorial board, contributors, and readership of *Quaestio*, I thank the UCLA Department of History and its outstanding faculty for their investment in undergraduate research.

I now invite you to enjoy the journal. I hope you will find that the quality of the scholarship contained herein does UCLA’s distinguished name justice.

Respectfully yours,

Diane Bani-Esraili
Editor-in-Chief
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Colonial Influences on Traditional Islamic Learning in India

by Sohaib Baig

As the British consolidated their rule over India in the late eighteenth century, they triggered significant upheavals in the indigenous system of education. These were not always enshrouded in terms of assertions of colonial authority and resistance to colonial authority, but also created a setting where British-sponsored educational institutions involved a wide array of Muslim Indian scholars within their operation. This left them vulnerable to new British concepts and institutions which would be continually developed and cemented within their consciousness as British policy changed and evolved throughout the nineteenth century. Thus, madrasas, or centers of learning which represented a widespread, informal indigenous system of education within India, were also eventually impacted as Muslim scholars began to institutionalize them along British patterns of organization and bureaucracy to bolster their own visions and plans for Islamic learning within India. In this article, I attempt to analyze British policy making which may have had an impact on the emergence of the institutional madrasas. Here, I treat

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1 This article is excerpted from a larger senior thesis entitled, “Traditional Islamic Learning in Colonial India: The Madrasa through the Eyes of a 20th Century Islamic Reformer.”
institutions not just as representing models of organization and bureaucracy, but also as embodying deeper principles and ideals stemming directly from the British. I attempt to expose how British secularism, religion, politics, and economics all played an important role in fashioning the forms and shapes of the educational policies and institutions throughout British rule.

British attitudes towards the education of the “natives” were continuously evolving. Initially, they were not even concerned about Indian education. While the East India Company (EIC) had provided chaplains and schools for the instruction of its own employees, it was initially largely indifferent to the education of the Indians and saw itself primarily as a commercial enterprise.\(^2\) Thus, Western education of the Indians was confined to whatever missionaries or the governor-general at Calcutta managed to do themselves.\(^3\) Yet, as Parliament concern began increasing over rumors of corruption and disorder especially following the takeover of Bengal at the Battle of Plessey in 1757, the EIC began facing more scrutiny from the Parliament. In an attempt to bring order and organization to the Company, in 1773, the Company’s directors appointed Warren Hastings (d. 1818) as the first governor-


The reign of Hastings (1773-1785) was extremely influential in laying the basic foundations for British administration and rule. His rule witnessed, among other things, the foundation of the Calcutta Madrasa in 1781 as well as the institutionalization of many important British concepts about Indians that had far reaching impacts for India. These concepts will be explored below.

Hastings’ mission to bring order and organization to the Company led him to realize that he would have to bring order and systematization to British knowledge of native affairs, and more importantly, knowledge of the Indian sciences and languages. Under him, the British thus began earnest efforts to conquer “not only a territory but an epistemological space as well.” Indian sciences and languages were to be learned and studied so they could be classified and categorized under British modes of understanding, and transformed into usable forms, such as statistical returns, surveys, and histories that would bolster British political and ideological control of India. Hastings himself had come with two preconceived ideas about Indian culture: first, that there existed a fixed body of original Indian law that had been corrupted over the centuries and second, that

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there were different civil codes for Muslims and Hindus. Thus, he embarked upon a project of determining the original “fixed” code of laws that could be utilized by the British. In doing so, Hastings was in many ways institutionalizing and inaugurating the “Orientalist” phase of British rule. “Orientalists” claimed to introduce the West to the “literary treasures of the East,” as well as to protect Indian culture and heritage from the “oblivion to which foreign rule might doom it.” Scholars such as Nathaniel Halhed (1751-1830), Jonathan Duncan (1756-1811), and Charles Wilkins (1749-1836) thus attempted to study Sanskrit and Persian learning “with the same methods and respect” with which they would study European learning. Although some British officials had been studying Indian languages from before, Hastings gave power and organization to this movement. He also considerably involved the Indians in the British process, employing them as judges and officials. This, Hastings believed, was necessary to strengthen British rule not only by conquering the mysteries of Indian law and tradition, but also by making British rule more administratively efficient in the complicated tangle of the Indian scene.

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8 Bernard S. Cohn, “Notes on the History of Indian Society and Culture” in *An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), 147.
Despite their scholarly pretenses and achievements, “Orientalists” were not simply “learning” Indian language and law – they were transforming them into European objects, which once classified and bounded, would constitute components that would help consolidate British rule. Indeed, Orientalism was born out of a heightened political awareness, as explicitly recognized by Hastings himself: “Every accumulation of knowledge, and especially such is obtained by social communication with people all over whom we exercise a dominion founded on the right of conquest is useful to the state: it is the gain of humanity…”¹⁰ The underlying purpose of the accumulation of knowledge to serve as a utility for the state thus was clear to Hastings, and would remain a key marker by which future British administrators and scholars compared the advantages of one system of education with another. Now Indian scholars, judges and lawyers could all participate in and become “instruments” of colonial rule.¹¹ Thus, not only would they serve the British, but they could also be influenced by British utilization of Indian knowledge and British ideas in general. For example, the codification of Hindu Law led to a “Brahmanization of law,” as Brahmin law under British


¹¹ Cohn, *Colonialism and its Forms*, 21.
influence began to dominate over local Hindu and caste law.\textsuperscript{12} Indians would also be given considerable time to become acquainted with British bureaucracy and institutions, which would later become an integral part of the reformist madrasas.

One such British institution was the Calcutta Madrasa, which was founded in 1781. In line with his Orientalist beliefs, Hastings had enthusiastically supported the Calcutta Madrasa, even securing financial support from London in 1782, long before the Charter of 1813 made the responsibility for native education an obligation for the British.\textsuperscript{13} By teaching them Arabic and Persian, he aimed to create “well qualified officers” that could serve in the British bureaucracy and Courts of Justice.\textsuperscript{14} This development had a profound impact on the educational scene. It marked the first time the traditional Dars-i Nizami curriculum would be taught to a Muslim audience, by Muslims, in a structuralized and institutionalized manner. Whether or not this model specifically would be imitated by Muslim madrasas later on, the practice of the institution would thus finally be introduced to the Muslim population as something

\textsuperscript{12} Metcalf, \textit{A Concise History}, 59.
\textsuperscript{13} Mojibur Rahman, \textit{History of Madrasah Education with Special Reference to Calcutta Madrasah and W.B Madrasah Education Board} (Calcutta: Rais Anwer Rahman, 1977), 77.
\textsuperscript{14} Syed Mahmood, \textit{A History of English Education in India: its Rise, Development, Progress, Present Condition and Prospects, being a Narrative of the Various Phases of Educational Policy and Measures Adopted under the British Rule from its Beginning to the Present Period 1781 to 1893} (Aligarh: M.O.A College, 1895), 18.
they could interact with and utilize for their own purposes. It signified an instance of a mutually complicit and interpenetrated relationship between the colonizers and the colonized, where the ideals and actions of each party were renegotiated and carried through in new environments and settings.

The strong British connection to the institutions did not seem to form a cause for Muslim suspicion and distrust, probably because the British still made sure to give it a strong Muslim and Indian character. In fact, the founding of a madrasa in Calcutta had been requested by the “gentry of Calcutta” themselves, to help the “poor Muslim community who could not afford to send their children in expensive schools and colleges,” though it is not exactly clear which expensive schools they were referring to. The first “head moulana” would be Mawlana Majd al-Din,\(^\text{15}\) a scholar who had the honor of studying directly under Shah Wali Allah Dehlavi, an intellectual giant and reformer of Indian Islam in the eighteenth century.\(^\text{16}\) Thus, an undeniably traditional personality, who gained his knowledge and credibility solely through traditional means, was now rerouted to work and serve under a British system. This marked a major victory for Hastings, who vigorously supported this project. Initially, the madrasa also started out in a traditional fashion – it began in a

\(^{15}\) Apart from Majd al-Din, I’ve also seen names such as “Muiz-ud-din” and “Mulla Madan” to describe the same person.

\(^{16}\) Mojibur Rahman, *History of Madrasah Education*, 75.
small home just like any other madrasa, but was soon forced to move to its own property to deal with the overwhelming number of students it attracted. And although Mawlana Majd al-Din would be forced to retire in 1791, another Muslim would take up his post as principal – thus maintaining the Muslim character of this British-sponsored institution though this decision would be criticized later on.\footnote{W.W. Hunter, \textit{The Indian Musalmans: Are They Bound in Conscience to Rebel against the Queen}? (London: Trubner and Company, 1871), 199.}

The Calcutta Madrasa as it existed during this stage remains important to our study for several reasons. First is the Muslim coloring of this British institution, which signifies the beginning of the introduction of the institution into a Muslim reality. It also signifies the fact that the Indian Muslim-British relationship was not simply that of one-sided appropriations of the British and the resistance and self-assertion of the colonized Muslims, as might be understood by the phenomenon of the “conservative” reformist madrasas later on. In fact, Muslims remained susceptible to adopting and incorporating British influences, which would later enable them to find room within their own traditions and view these features as consistent with their own, as happened with the institution. Second were the changes inherent in the institution itself: the pedagogical changes involving the system of examination, fixed curriculum, separate departments, and class division created by the institution were
previously foreign to India and would also be picked up by reformist madrasas, perhaps as an expression of their own desire to regulate and systematize the traditional process of learning.

The third reason was an example of the overall role played by institutions within Indian society, a role which may have not been immediately apparent and stemmed from British understandings of India. The Calcutta Madrasa was uniquely exclusionist in nature. This colonial construction specifically was aimed towards uplifting one segment of the Indian population, at the exclusion of the other. The “other,” Hindu, segment of the population was granted the Benares Sanskrit College in 1791, which followed along the same goals of providing Hindu officers for the British bureaucracy while cultivating Sanskrit literacy and knowledge of Hindu law. Although perhaps there was not a strict division in terms of student population, there evidently was at the foundational level. For the British, a division along these lines of religion and language seemed perfectly natural and logical, considering their conceptualizing of different laws for Muslims and Hindus. Such a division was a new phenomenon in the Indian scene, though. While Hindus and Muslims may have carried different sets of laws at certain levels, it was much more blurry than the English perceived it as. Under Mughal times, the road to government employment, which was the goal of this institution, did not actually require separate institutions, as the
language of the educated class was Persian. Thus, Hindus and Muslims both had become participants in and contributors to the Persian tradition, which itself underwent transformations as it was absorbed by the world of Hindustan. In fact, even as the eighteenth century witnessed British ascension over India, it also witnessed the highest usage of Persian by Hindu authors.\textsuperscript{18} There did exist separate schools, but their informal nature usually made for permeable boundaries and did not represent the same absolute exclusion announced by the British.

Thus, by building two different institutions for the Hindus and Muslims to service their own empire, the British began a process of unraveling an intellectual and social relationship that had formed over centuries of interaction and intermingling. Sponsoring these institutions gave them the right to assert what was “Muslim” and what was “Hindu,” and apply these labels accordingly. Persian and Arabic would eventually become known as “Muslim” languages, while Sanskrit would remain the “Hindu” language. Here, not only can we detect the seeds of later Hindu-Muslim battles over the narrative of their historical relationship,\textsuperscript{19} and of what constituted true Indian nature, but we can also understand the eventual discarding of the

\textsuperscript{18} Robinson, \textit{The 'Ulama of Farangi Mahall}, 18.  
\textsuperscript{19} Later, James Mill (1773-1836) would light the intellectual fire of this debate by his strict division of the history of India into separate Muslim, British, and Hindu eras. Jamal Malik, \textit{Islam in South Asia: A Short History} (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 243.
Dars-i Nizami curriculum by Hindus in their own schools, and the intense emphasis placed on it by Muslim madrasas later on. Although there were many factors at play for the heightened communalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the idea that each scholar could only intellectually best cater to their own community was also key to establishing the exclusivist nature of the reformist madrasas later on. This feature of the Calcutta Madrasa thus formed an example of the institutionalization of British perceptions regarding the relationship of Hindus and Muslims.

The relatively close relationship between Indians and British as instituted by Hastings in his administration did come under attack from British quarters. Hastings’ successor as governor-general, Lord Cornwallis (1786-1793) struggled with European corruption, and came to the conclusion it was caused precisely by “contact with natives.” He thus began to exclude Indians from public office, and he would remain at best indifferent towards Oriental learning. Cornwallis’ successors however returned to Hastings’ favorable approach towards Oriental learning, but could not hold out for long. The opposition towards Indian learning was widened in the aftermath of the Charter Act of 1813. This charter, which renewed the Company’s permission to operate, officially sanctioned

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missionary activity “in its completest and widest sense,” and obligated the company to provide for the revival and encouragement of education among the Indian natives. In addition, the EIC’s trade monopoly was abolished, thus opening India to new traders who lacked the EIC’s experience and refined approach towards Indian affairs.

At the same time, attention began to shift towards reforming “Indian character.” Oriental literature, it was soon learned, inevitably carried with it the religious biases of the Indian faiths – something which was unacceptable in the British campaign to uplift the Indians morally and intellectually. Missionaries and private traders, who had gained more prominence following the Charter Act of 1813, were especially forceful in arguing for Western education along English lines. The vague wording of the 1813 Charter Act regarding “revival” further opened the door to furious debates and opposing interpretations. Was “revival” to mean a revival of Indian literature, as the Orientalists insisted? Charles Trevelyan (1807-1886), one of the most vocal opponents of Orientalism, declared that the Oriental project had only served to produce “a revival, not of sound learning, but of antiquated and pernicious errors.”

He, like his brother-in-law Lord Macaulay, fiercely supported

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21 J.A. Richter, pp. 150-1, quoted in J. P. Naik and Nurullah Syed, A Students’ History of Education in India, 48.
22 Charles Trevelyan, On the Education of the People of India (London: Longman, Orme, Brown, Green & Longmans, 1838), 89.
Anglicism, which called for direct Western education in English for the natives. In 1835, Lord Macaulay (1800-1859), the most famous Anglicist perhaps of all, published his landmark minute in favor of English education. Unsurprisingly, Lord Bentinck (1833-1835), the governor-general at the time, passed his famous resolution a few months later establishing “the great object of the British government” to be the “promotion of European literature and science” through “English education alone.”

The existing Orientalist institutions would continue to exist, but would not be funded to grow and spread (which may have marked a compromise from Macaulay’s call to abolish them all). This marked the official beginning of the marginalization of Oriental education, a marginalization which would have an immeasurable impact on the perceptions and roles of the reformist madrasas.

Although it is beyond the scope of this article to fully demonstrate the vast consequences of the legislative and ideological shift towards Anglicism, one major theme inherent in this shift was the deep ideological and institutional “separation” of European and traditional Indian sciences. Now, European and Indian traditions were unequivocally declared as representing two different streams of learning, with one of them being held as clearly superior to the other. This was perpetuated in part by the Anglicist dismissal of traditional Indian literature as not

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23 Ibid., 14 (emphasis added).
constituting important intellectual value, but it also was arguably fueled more so by the idea that the two bodies of knowledge promoted different morals, ethics, and intellectual perspectives on life. Anglicists promoted English, not only because of the “pre-eminence” of English in the world, as many of them grandiloquently argued, but also to promote English morals and values. As Macaulay famously wrote, the goal was to produce “a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect” – emphasizing the transformational power and purpose of European learning that was actually supposed to override and protect against any harmful effects of traditional Indian education. Perhaps the most significant conclusion of this line of thinking was its extension to the institutional level.

Oriental institutions thus became starkly differentiated from English colleges, in terms of funding and reputation. Although some Oriental institutions did have English departments, they usually had a separate batch of students, which were often measured up and compared with each other.\(^24\) According to Viswanathan, after 1835, the teaching of English would become “confined to institutions devoted to studies entirely conducted in English.”\(^25\) Although there may have been exceptions, the differences of their functions were still perceived

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\(^{24}\) Mojibur Rahman, *History of Madrasah Education*, 123.
as being so vast as to cancel the possibility of a joint curriculum altogether at the mass level. Yet once they were separated, Oriental learning would become confined to its “archaic institutions,” and the Muslim traditional world would be sent reeling, struggling for survival in a dichotomy which would eventually become a major liability and responsibility of the ‘ulama, or the Muslim traditional scholars. Interestingly, the transformational power of European sciences, which had been touted by the British, would later be cited by ‘ulama as the very raison d’être why they resisted European education in the first place. Of those that opposed learning English, most would not oppose the learning of English per se; rather, they would oppose it on the grounds of the role and dangerous affects it was perceived to be capable of causing in their specific historical climate.  

This, combined with the popular fears nurtured about the activities of missionaries, would thus shelve together English and Indian sciences in two exclusive, opposing boxes. And because the British had rejected sponsoring Indian education, they were perceived as aiming to supersede Indian and specifically Islamic culture. The reformist madrasas would thus see themselves as having to swim upstream to restore some

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26 For example, see the fatwa by Mawlana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanwi (1863-1943) on the permissibility of learning English: Ashraf ‘Ali Thanwi, Tahqiq-i Ta’lim-i Ingrezi (Deoband: Maktabah Dar al-Tabligh, 1900).
semblance of the previous priority and position occupied by the traditional sciences.

It is worth noting that this attribution of a “corrective” or transformational function for Western education was also present among Orientalist scholars. Indeed, the distinctions between “Orientalists” and “Anglicists” had become increasingly blurry in the mid nineteenth century, even as the distinctions between Oriental sciences and Western sciences had grown.\textsuperscript{27} As Margrit Pernau reveals, beneath the zeal of Aloys Sprenger (1813-1893), one of the most prolific Orientalists, was the idea that “while the East only contributes knowledge to the West, which remains otherwise unchanged, it is itself to be transformed by Western knowledge…”\textsuperscript{28} Despite his interest for Oriental literature, his book on the life of the Prophet Muhammad also drew great criticism from Muslim scholars, most notably Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who actually wrote a deeply scathing review of it.\textsuperscript{29} This distinction helps us understand the experiment at Delhi College, a unique British institution which attempted to transmit Western education through the vernacular language of Urdu. Although at first glance it seemed to be a neatly balanced mixture of both

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} Gail Minault, “Aloys Sprenger: German Orientalism's 'Gift' to Delhi College,” \textit{South Asia Research} 31, no. 1 (2011): 7-23.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Margrit Pernau, introduction to \textit{The Delhi College: Traditional Elites, the Colonial State, and Education before 1857}, ed. Margrit Pernau (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 18.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Minault, “Aloys Sprenger: German Orientalism's 'Gift' to Delhi College,” 17.
\end{itemize}
Western and Eastern learning, at a closer look, the asymmetry becomes clear. The choice of the Delhi College itself, which was established over a remnant madrasa from Aurangzeb’s time, was the result of a careful political calculation. More importantly, Urdu was chosen as the medium of language mainly because it was believed that it may wield greater power than English in disarming the natives’ minds and stimulating their intellectual capabilities with Western education. Thus, it was no surprise that translation became the center of the Delhi College’s activities, especially after Sprenger’s three year reign from 1845-1847 as its principal. Though it is a different question altogether of how successful the Orientalists actually were in imparting Western education through the process of translation, the inferior position of the Orientalist sciences vis-à-vis Western sciences in the perspective of Orientalist scholars was not a secret, and therefore hints towards an unequal separation of Oriental and Western science wherever the distinctions were actually institutionalized. This would have large repercussions not only on the status, but also the mobility of the ‘ulama in the quest (or lack thereof) of somehow connecting the two together in their madrasas.

Another hurdle encountered by the British in their quest to uplift the natives was the issue of religion. The long-standing
tensions between missionaries and the Company officials again simmered through here, and debates broke out on religious neutrality. Should the Bible be taught to the Indians? How could Christian morals be imparted to the natives? In this regard, the discovery of English literature, as Viswanathan demonstrates, proved crucial. Missionaries could now be assured that Christian morals would theoretically still be indirectly imbibed through the technically “unreligious” British literature, while the Company would not have to bear the political consequences of Indian outrage over explicit proselytizing.  

Although the fortunes of English literature posed different dynamics, and debates continued as the studies took various twists, the ultimate consequence this had on the madrasa scene was the introduction of the dichotomy between the secular and the religious sciences. Post-Enlightenment Europe itself was reaching a point where religion was becoming subordinated and confined to a private and “inessential” sphere. This new status granted to religion could be seen in the private institutions built for religious purposes – they were private, yet inessential for the functioning of the rest of society. In India, where religion was nowhere near as clearly demarcated and detached from the rest of society as it was in Britain, the British strove to dig out its boundaries.

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and imprint them in the minds of the Indians. This was considered part of the quest to civilize them, and was done by either diminishing the role of religious studies even in Oriental institutions, or by removing them altogether. The status of religious knowledge was further weakened by the spread of utilitarianism, under which religious knowledge was deemed as useless, while secular knowledge was deemed useful. Thus, in the Delhi College, for example, there was an “almost complete exclusion of religious books.” The primary goals of learning Arabic and Persian became simply the mastery of the languages, not studying religion.34 In the curriculum of the Calcutta Madrasa, the only religious texts included in 1850 were law books – nothing is mentioned about the foremost authorities of religion, the Qur’an or Hadith.35 In Punjab, the Director of Public Instruction in 1858 actually “ordered all village schools to be removed from the precincts of mosques and other buildings of a religious character.”36 Thus, even beyond the distinctions made between Indian and Western sciences, the British did come effectively discriminate and in many ways create distinctions

34 Pernau, introduction to The Delhi College, 25.
36 Education Report from the Director of Public Instruction, Punjab to the Financial Commissioner, Punjab, June 25, 1858, section 18; extracts in G. W. Leitner, History of Indigenous Education in the Punjab since Annexation and in 1882 (Patiala: Languages Department Punjab, 1971 [first published in 1883]), Appendix, vi, 20.
between religious sciences and secular sciences that were originally intertwined in the prevailing Dars-i Nizami curriculum.

The British debates on Orientalism and Anglicism, on whether to financially endorse the study of Indian languages and sciences, at the end of the day still represented just one aspect of education – they simply dealt with what education the British would impart in British-run schools. The indigenous traditional system was not the primary concern here. Thus, even while “Orientalism” was still in vogue, British economic policies were destroying the system of indigenous education without paying any heed to the more polished debates occurring between the Orientalists and Anglicists.\textsuperscript{37} The Permanent Settlement in 1793 by Lord Cornwallis, the successor of Hastings, signified the “virtual closing of the door to land-lordism to Muslims” at least in Bengal.\textsuperscript{38} Although different sectors of society reacted differently to British policies, losses incurred by Muslim landholders had direct consequences for the education and culture they patronized.\textsuperscript{39} Even W.W. Hunter in 1871 blamed British economic policy for the loss of Muslim schools, saying it

\textsuperscript{37} Gregory C. Kozlowski, \textit{Muslim Endowments and Society in British India} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 21-32.
\textsuperscript{38} Hardy, \textit{The Muslims of British India}, 43.
\textsuperscript{39} Farhan Ahmad Nizami, “Madrasahs, Scholars and Saints: Muslim Response to the British presence in Delhi and the Upper Doab 1803-1857” (PhD diss., University of Oxford, 1983), 44.
had delivered the Muslim educational system in Bengal “its death-blow.”\textsuperscript{40} Thus, it was not surprising that the reformist madrasas would also be built with an overall feeling of decline and extinction. If many Muslim landholders had started feeling “threatened by the Company,” it would be unsurprising to find the scholars who depended on their patronage feeling threatened by the Company as well. Institutions such as the Calcutta Madrasa and the Delhi College formed unique points of interaction and confluence, but would prove insufficient in keeping traditionalist concerns at bay over their perceived potential extinction. The Delhi College itself would never recover after 1857. In a telling indication of their attitudes, the historian of the Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband would write regarding the context in which the madrasa was founded: after 1857, “the English… left nothing unturned in destroying Islamic learning and sciences…”\textsuperscript{41} Thus, there was a very real perception amongst at least the founders of Deoband that they were fighting for the very survival of traditional Islamic education.

Thus, British policies, including educational, political, and economic policies introduced and institutionalized many ideas in India. The distinctions between Hindu and Muslim education, traditional and Western education, secular and religious subjects, as embodied by their institutions greatly

\textsuperscript{40}W.W. Hunter, \textit{The Indian Musalmans}, 183.

\textsuperscript{41}Rizwi, \textit{Tarikh Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband}, 150.
influenced the ‘ulama who also were interacting with them. This, along with the added elements of fear over the survival of traditional education and religion left the ‘ulama in a bind to focus solely on the aspects they considered most precious to them. These would go long ways to influence the orientation of the reformist madrasas they would soon establish themselves.
Colonial Influences on Traditional Islamic Learning in India

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In an essay entitled “Œil pour œil,” or “An Eye for An Eye,” French intellectual Simone de Beauvoir reflected on the philosophical problems associated with revenge in post-World War II society. First published in the February 1946 issue of the journal *Les Temps modernes* [Modern Times] and later republished in a separate collection called *L’Existentialisme et la sagesse des nations* (1948) [Existentialism and the Wisdom of Nations], “Œil pour œil” is a brief yet striking justification for capital punishment. Beauvoir concluded that an organized justice system with the power to dispense a death sentence, despite various inadequacies and imperfections, was necessary for a society to counteract the crimes of war criminals and collaborators.

Though Beauvoir cited various perpetrators in the essay, she specifically related her own experience attending the trial of the French journalist Robert Brasillach which took place in January 1945, about one year before the essay’s publication. During his term as editor of the fascist journal *Je suis partout*, Brasillach wrote a column entitled “Partout et ailleurs” [“Everywhere and elsewhere”] in which he published the identities and whereabouts of French Jews, left-leaning
intellectuals, and members of the resistance. These denunciations facilitated the deportation and murder of thousands, including some of Beauvoir’s close friends, making Brasillach guilty—in Beauvoir’s eyes—of the worst crime of all: stripping a man of his humanity through the process of objectification.¹ Beauvoir was acquainted with Brasillach’s writings during the war, refused to sign a petition urging his pardon when sentenced to death, and, after his execution, observed the French intellectual community engage in an extended debate over his role and responsibility as a writer in the public sphere. His execution, she argued, was justified because it attempted to restore both a basic reciprocity between human beings and a mutual recognition of ambiguity—the notion that we are both subjects and objects in the world.

The essay’s significance is twofold: first, it demonstrates Beauvoir’s newfound political awareness, which, she later admitted in memoirs, had been absent before the Second World War. Second, the essay is an early example of Beauvoir grappling with the philosophical concept of, and problems associated with, ambiguity—a central theme later articulated in her major philosophical text *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, making the essay an important milestone in the development of her conception of an existentialist ethics.

The fact that Beauvoir justified an institutionalized death penalty on philosophical grounds is in conflict with central tenets of the existentialist framework—one that places human freedom as the very foundation of the human experience. Beauvoir’s position must be situated in two important contexts: first in a particular historical context, namely the post-WWII frenzy for vengeance against Nazi collaborators and second, in a particular philosophical context, as Beauvoir belonged to a very unique generation of French intellectuals that rejected the naïve optimism of Third Republic’s philosophy curriculum, preferring instead the 1930s foreign influx of German phenomenology. A historical and philosophical contextualization of “Œil pour œil” has not yet been accomplished in one piece of scholarship, and strangely “Œil pour œil” overall has elicited little response from Beauvoir scholars. There is generally less interest in Simone de Beauvoir’s philosophical writings—a consequence of her feminist and literary celebrity, the shadow cast by Jean-Paul Sartre’s reputation as the main figure of French existentialism, and her own self-effacing insistence that she was not a philosopher. “Œil pour œil” has never been the primary focus of study, leaving a thorough understanding of the essay conspicuously absent.

Two academics have made note of the essay in their larger works. The late Elaine Marks, renowned for her studies on
Beauvoir and French feminism, briefly mentioned the essay in her book *Simone de Beauvoir: Encounters with Death*, which focuses on the prominent theme of death in Beauvoir’s œuvre. Marks’ “Œil pour œil” commentary is less than a page in length, though long enough for Marks to express her disdain for the essay, labeling it as an “apology for violence” and a “blood-thirsty” tract. Marks briefly acknowledged the context in which “Œil pour œil” was written—the “frenzy of righteous vengeance and violence that seized many Frenchmen”—but spends the majority of her analysis attacking Beauvoir’s apparent lack of common humanity. Marks writes: “Her inability to relate to people with whom she is not intimate prevents her from feeling for them.” In fact, within “Œil pour œil” Beauvoir displayed a remarkable ability to relate to people, expressing her feelings of sympathy, and even sometimes admiration, for Brasillach during his trial.

Another scholar, Kristana Arp, mainly substitutes philosophical analysis in lieu of historical context. Despite this, hers is the most developed understanding of “Œil pour œil” to date. Her commentary resides in a brief section within her book *The Bonds of Freedom* (2001), a text lauding Beauvoir for creating an existentialist ethics, an important accomplishment Arp argues, given that many critics of Existentialism insisted that

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an ethical system could not be constructed on a philosophy dependant on human freedom and choice.\textsuperscript{3} Arp praises “Œil pour œil” specifically because it is in this essay that Beauvoir first defined her conception of the human ambiguity. Indeed it is Arp who first translated and introduced the essay in \textit{The Beauvoir Series}—an ongoing project published by the University of Illinois Press. Though Arp provides a helpful and succinct explanation of “Œil pour œil,” because the essay is one of many of Beauvoir’s writings cited in \textit{The Bonds of Freedom} there is little historical context specifically provided for the essay. Such details—not only of the postwar period but of Beauvoir’s own philosophical development before and during the war—would greatly enhance understanding of the essay itself and would also better situate Beauvoir’s thinking in the context of the tense atmosphere of postwar France.

“Œil pour œil” deserves to be the focal point of an academic project because it represents the convergence of Beauvoir’s philosophical development regarding ambiguity and her personal experience living through the Nazi Occupation and Liberation. It needs to be situated both philosophically and historically and highlighted as an important milestone in Beauvoir’s œuvre. Beauvoir’s essay is representative of the pervasive postwar effort to make sense of humanity’s failing in

\textsuperscript{3} Kristana Arp, \textit{Bonds of Freedom: Simone de Beauvoir’s Existentialist Ethics} (Chicago: Open Court Press, 2001), 1.
the hands of fascist regimes, and a focused analysis of the essay itself will help the reader better grasp Beauvoir’s own unique philosophical justification of revenge. The following section of this article is a close analysis of “Œil pour œil.”

Les Temps modernes was founded in October 1945 and edited collectively by Beauvoir, Sartre, Raymond Aron, Michel Leiris, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Albert Ollivier, and Jean Paulhan. Beauvoir enjoyed article-writing, admitting in her memoirs that is was “very useful to have at hand the means of expressing immediately our impatience, our surprise, our approval.”

An exception to preceding sentiment is “Œil pour œil,” which was not crafted as a quick response to “news on the wing,” but rather as an extended reflection on the postwar trials of collaborators and the problems with enacting justice upon them. Beauvoir mentioned several “perpetrators” in the essay, including Vichy leader Pierre Laval and Milice leader Joseph Darnard, though the most focused commentary related her personal experience of attending Robert Brasillach’s trial. It is this experience and indeed the fact that she shared membership with Brasillach in the French intellectual community that made her perspective in the essay unique. Because she herself was a witness to the courtroom proceedings, Beauvoir can write about the problems with punishment in “Œil pour œil” with authority.

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Beauvoir recounted his trial in her essay, along with events that took place the year following his death, such as the liberation of Nazi concentration camps and the initial proceedings of the Nuremberg trials, which introduced a new concept: crimes against humanity. In “Œil pour œil,” Beauvoir argued that Brasillach by way of his pen committed so severe a crime and that this suggested a premeditated criminality for which he should be held accountable. Brasillach was not a Vichy government leader. He held no executive, legislative, judicial, military or police office. Executor of no orders, he dropped no bombs, nor fired any rifle or pistol. Brasillach was a writer; his weapon: the pen. His crime: intellectual collaboration by way of his denunciations in the French fascist journal *Je suis partout*. Sentenced and executed even before the leaders of the Vichy regime had been tried, Brasillach is distinguished as the only prominent intellectual to be killed during the period known as the “Purge.” Other fascist sympathizers in literary circles, like Céline, had fled the country or, in the case of Drieu La Rochelle, committed suicide. Brasillach’s trial at the Palais de Justice was a controversial event for French journalists and writers. His execution was even more incendiary, igniting a veritable firestorm of reflections on the writer’s responsibility for their words.
Beauvoir opened her “Œil pour œil” with a profound conclusion about the war: it had irrevocably changed the French people by intensifying their feelings about justice. She declared: “Since June 1940 we have learned rage and hate. We have wished humiliation and death on our enemies…Their crimes have struck at our own hearts. It is our values, our reasons to live that are affirmed by their punishment.”\(^5\) The Fall of France and the subsequent Occupation left the French people demanding retribution from those who had betrayed them. But who should be punished? Beauvoir’s answer was that real, “authentic” criminals were those who objectified fellow human beings through a process of torture, humiliation, and assassination. What was outrageous about these crimes, Beauvoir argued, was that they stripped a man of his humanity and effectively turned a human being into an object.\(^6\) The only punishment suitable for such an offense was one commensurate with the crime: death. The biblical principle of an eye for an eye was certainly not an original contribution to thoughts on justice; instead, what made the concepts in “Œil pour œil” unique was Beauvoir’s assertion that punishment restored a necessary equity between human beings: the reciprocity of human consciousness—a Hegelian idea\(^6\).

\(^6\) Beauvoir, *Philosophical Writings*, 248.
that had so impressed Beauvoir during her study of *Phenomenology of Spirit* during the war.

The torturer, according to Beauvoir, believed himself to be of “sovereign consciousness” in the face of his victim—to wit: the “master” in Hegel’s master-slave dialectic—without any recognition that his victim possessed the same rights and privileges of freedom. The failure to recognize one’s victim as an equal caused an imbalance and constituted the “most fundamental form of injustice” and could only be rectified by restoring reciprocity, or acknowledgement of the other’s consciousness.⁷ Beauvoir believed punishment to be the solution because it was in part a means of imposing recognition of his victim’s humanity on the criminal, an *understanding* that Heidegger referred to as “the process by means of which our entire being realizes a situation.”⁸ For Beauvoir, “realizing” had an important corporeal element, though the dialectic was not so easily restored by the experience of physical pain. She explained: “One understands an instrument in using it. One understands torture by undergoing it. But even if the torturer feels in turn what the victim felt, this cannot remedy the evil that the torturer caused. It is necessary, besides this revived suffering, that the totality of a situation also be revived.”

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⁷ Ibid., 249.
⁸ Ibid., 248
Beauvoir believed that the ultimate goal of punishment was not to inflict pain upon the torturer, but to instill the understanding that his victim shared the same freedoms he had assumed were solely his own: “When [the perpetrator] turn comes to be made into a tortured thing himself, he feels the tragic ambiguity of his condition as man. What he must understand, though, is that the victim, whose abjection he shares, also shares with him the privileges that he believed he could arrogate to himself.” In an ideal scenario, she argued, punishment was the catalyst to make the torturer recognize human ambiguity, understand his victim as an equal, and restore the balance of human reciprocity.

Problematically, an act of perfect revenge was difficult to impose. Beauvoir examined the difficulties of exacting retribution, finally deeming that “perfect acts of vengeance,” or acts that purely restored reciprocity, were rare. She acknowledged two major obstacles: the torturer’s own freedom and the justice system. As an existentialist, Beauvoir believed all men to be free. The problem with punishment, she conceded, was that in the final analysis it was not punishment that restored reciprocity, but the torturer’s own conscience. The torturer himself needed to make the choice to recognize the freedom of his victim. Although being punished might encourage him to do

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9 Ibid., 248-249.
10 Ibid., 251.
so, it was not sufficient on its own. What Beauvoir found disturbing was that a torturer retained the freedom to refuse to acknowledge his victims as human beings. The essential lesson of human ambiguity could be ignored or denied. Fascists and collaborators could view themselves as victims or even martyrs rather than recognizing their own culpability, leaving the delicate stasis of human reciprocity out of balance.

The second obstacle to perfect revenge Beauvoir described was the justice system itself. The fact that society and the justice system had to act on the victim’s behalf, instead of the victim acting for himself, diluted the pure form of revenge. Beauvoir acknowledged that State intervention into the process of retribution failed to wholly reestablish reciprocity. Still, she recognized the danger of individuals taking justice into their own hands; their freedom to seek revenge could result in “tyranny,” or tribal blood feuds and such street justice was hardly a workable alternative.\(^\text{11}\) She accepted that the social justice system was a necessary though imperfect institution because it discouraged future wanton acts of violence and personal vendettas. Judges restored “a human community to itself” and upheld “the values the crime negated,” at the expense of a purer form of revenge.\(^\text{12}\)

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11 Ibid., 258.
12 Ibid., 252.
The courtroom, Beauvoir lamented, was also problematic. A public trial became a form of vicarious live theater. During her critique of the justice system that she first disclosed that she had been in the courtroom during Robert Brasillach’s proceedings: “I know how I was struck on entering the large hall where the trial of Brasillach was taking place. The public assembled there out of curiosity, the journalists there for professional reasons, the magistrates exercising their function as magistrates and attempting in vain to raise themselves to the level of true grandeur.” Brasillach was the central dramatic character transformed by the power of empathy into a sympathetic everyman, a misunderstood victim of circumstances, a frail and flawed human being like everyone else. She remarked: the “vanquished foe was no more than a poor, pitiful old man. It became difficult to wish for his death.” For Beauvoir, Brasillach’s trial was full of “pomp” and ceremony, a disturbing spectacle in which Brasillach became a victim himself:

And in his box, alone, cut off from everyone, there was a man…in the presence of his death…Whatever his life had been like, whatever the reasons for his death, the dignity with which he carried himself in this extreme situation demanded our respect in the moment we most desired to despise him. We desired the death of the

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13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., 253.
editor of *Je suis partout*, not that of this man completely occupied in dying well.\(^{15}\)

Remarkably, Beauvoir acknowledged Brasillach’s strength, courage, and honesty in the face of imminent death. True to her existentialist background, she commended Brasillach for taking responsibility, no matter how disgusted she was by his actions: “…I did not desire his death, for during that long sinister ceremony he had deserved esteem rather than hatred.”\(^ {16}\)

A year of reflection passed between Beauvoir attending the trial and writing the essay, however, making Beauvoir realize that although Brasillach had “assumed his life” and his actions during the war, his death was still a necessity. After grappling with the problem of revenge for pages, she ended “Œil pour œil” by concluding that her decision not to sign the petition for Brasillach’s pardon had been the right one. Brasillach made a *choice* to publish the identities of French Jews and left-leaning intellectuals in his journal. In doing so, he had failed in his duty to acknowledge their humanity and had thus committed the “sole sin against man.” He had rejected the ambiguity of man’s condition—and this is Beauvoir’s first conception of ambiguity in her writings—that he was “freedom and a thing, both unified and scattered, isolated by his subjectivity and nevertheless

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\(^{15}\) Ibid.
\(^{16}\) Ibid., 257.
coexisting at the heart of the world with other men.” Beauvoir believed Brasillach should have been as responsible for recognizing basic humanity in others as much as he was responsible for recognizing himself. His failure to assume that responsibility meant that he deserved retribution.

Beauvoir concluded her essay powerfully: “For to punish is to recognize man as free in evil as well as in good. It is to distinguish evil from good in the use that man makes of his freedom. It is to will the good.” Beauvoir believed punishment had a moral effect: to aid in the restoration of reciprocity between a torturer and his victim. Having an organized system to punish “authentic criminals” meant that society had a value system compelling individuals to use their freedom for good, not evil.

Attending Brasillach’s trial and observing the outcomes of postwar tribunals played a central role in inspiring Beauvoir to grapple with the concepts of human consciousness, human ambiguity, and responsibility—all central themes in her existentialist philosophy that would later coalesce in *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, considered to be her greatest philosophical text. Beauvoir stated in *The Ethics of Ambiguity* that freedom was “the source from which all significations and all values spring” and the “original condition of all justification of existence.”

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17 Ibid., 258.
18 Ibid., 259.
According to Beauvoir, it is a metaphysical necessity to recognize this freedom in oneself and in others and understanding the ambiguous relationship of inter-subjectivity was key. In this work she argued that ambiguity—the fact that an individual is a subject in his own right, but also an object in the eyes of Others—was the very basis for an ethical life. We are inseparable from others, we exist in an ever-present inter-subjectivity, and are thus are bound together by the responsibility of ensuring each other’s freedom and free consciousness. Acknowledging freedom is not enough; we must use our freedom, we must act, and we must be accountable to protect the freedom of others.

Beauvoir first defined human ambiguity in “Œil pour œil.” To reiterate: she writes that man is “at the same time a freedom and a thing, both unified and scattered, isolated by his subjectivity and nevertheless co-existing at the heart of the world with other men.” This idea is echoed in The Ethics of Ambiguity:

This privilege, which he [man] alone possesses, of being a sovereign and unique subject amidst a universe of objects, is what he shares with all his fellow men. In turn an object for others, he is nothing more than an individual in the collectivity on which he depends.¹⁹

So, “Œil pour œil” was an early opportunity for Beauvoir to publish her newfound meditations on ambiguity. A natural

question that arises is, why? Why did Beauvoir feel motivated to write the essay in this particular period? We know that philosophical trends in the 1930s and Beauvoir’s readings during the war years gave her the foundations and language with which to reflect on issues of consciousness and reciprocity in “Œil pour œil,” but what of her own experience? Beauvoir believed that all subjects were situated in a specific time and place and so we must examine Beauvoir not just philosophically situated but historically situated as well. What of her experience during the war and at the time of liberation inspired her to write on these issues, to take the stance in favor of Brasillach’s execution? Living in Nazi Occupied Paris during the duration of the war meant she was in direct contact with German soldiers and even lost friends in various rounds of deportations. Confronting daily the critical issues of choice and responsibility, Beauvoir developed a distinct morality that would shape her commitment both to freedom and to the protection of that freedom, even if it meant justifying an institutionalized apparatus for death and revenge.
An Eye for An Eye: Simone de Beauvoir on Justice in Postwar France

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Freemasonry: A Hybrid of Past and Present

by Maneesh Karna

Framed by the Enlightenment, eighteenth-century Europe underwent an ideological revolution. In *The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans*, Margaret Jacob outlines the effects of the radical Enlightenment, which ultimately gave prominence to radical principles of science, equality, and religious freedom. Founded on these principles, ideologies such as naturalism, materialism, republicanism, fraternalism, deism, and liberalism opposed the absolutist Christian orthodoxy practiced by the church. Consequently, this ideological revolution transformed the nature of religious thought. Masonic beliefs arose as an alternative to the conservative church, and fused the Bible with these radical eighteenth-century ideologies. The contrast between the principles of science, equality, and religious freedom found in manuscripts written by Christian Freemasons and the faith-based absolutism found in manuscripts written by Christian theologians evidenced this transformation.

Promoting materialism and naturalism, eighteenth-century scholars held science at the core of their view of the universe, rather than faith. Against the conservative view of the Christian church, eighteenth-century materialism and naturalism
are founded on the principle that nature, which is composed of matter, is the only existent form in the universe. Thus, these ideologies imply that a common human order, which would require the presence of the creator, does not exist.¹ Jacob illustrates the radical nature of these ideas: “In other words, the separation of God from Creation, creature from creator, of matter from spirit, so basic to Christian orthodoxy and such a powerful justification for social hierarchy and even for absolute monarchy, crumbles in the face of animistic and naturalistic explanations.”² The way to comprehend the universe changed from having faith in God to the observation of nature. Understanding the implications of naturalism and materialism against faith, the church criticized those who upheld them as science-deceived atheists. Despite this opposition, science and its metaphysical implications seized the power of eighteenth-century thought, and even Christian groups, such as the Freemasons, broadcasted scientific ideas throughout the European world.³

The growth of scientific ideologies in eighteenth-century European thought morphed Christian thought. Faith and worship of God underpinned orthodox Christianity, while science underpinned Masonic beliefs. Thus, Masonry further legitimized science. In Masonic society, a man could be accepted as both a

¹ Margaret C. Jacob, *The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and*  
² Jacob, 3  
³ Jacob, 3-4, 61, 74, 95.
scientist and a Christian without being condemned for being an atheist or a libertine. While conservative Christianity argued that virtue comes through faith and love for God, constructed God as the Trinity, and traced history through practices of faith, Masons contended that science leads to virtue, established God as the supreme Architect, and traced history through acts of science.

Leading conservative theologians argued that virtue is obtained by loving God, having faith in only the moral sense, and consequently observing the spiritual beauty which God has given through the moral sense. Jonathan Edwards, an eighteenth-century theologian, preacher, and missionary championed this thought in *The Nature of True Virtue*, and further asserted that love for God was the foundation of all virtue. To Edwards, the only legitimate thoughts followed the moral sense, which consisted primarily of loving God, rather than reason which relies on an association of ideas. He believed that all thoughts created by an association of ideas were sensual passions of blind men who were unable to see the true moral virtue given by God. Moreover, he maintained that benevolence and all other virtues could not have existed without love for God because they were secondary virtues founded upon love for God. Edwards declared any objection to this argument incorrect by default as it disagreed with the moral sense, which is under the authority of
Edwards contended that God had given the moral sense to man as a “mutual agreement of things beautiful and grateful to the individuals that perceive it.” Using Edwards as a representative of conservative Christianity, it can be seen that conservative Christianity relied on faith in God (who provided man with a moral compass) and that virtue was obtained by love for God in order to observe the beauty of the universe He created. Thus, the theory of the church’s path to virtue was focused entirely on God.

In the clerical view, God was portrayed in three forms combined into one (The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost), and held a faith-based relationship with mankind. Robert Walker, in response to the criticism of the Trinity, claimed that the form of the Trinity transcended reason and was thus not contradictory. Like Walker, G.W. Snyder, in response to Thomas Paine’s radical deist pamphlet *The Age of Reason*, defended conservative Christianity and supported Walker’s argument that the nature of the Trinity rose above the capabilities

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5 Dwight, Edwards, and Hickman, 419
G. W. Snyder, "The Age of Reason Unreasonable; Or, The Folly of Rejecting Revealed Religion. In a Series of Letters to a Friend," 1798, MS, Library of Congress, Philadelphia, Eighteenth Century Collections Online, 10
of reason. Each of the characters of the Trinity had distinct responsibilities, but their actions were still considered as one. Jehovah the Father acted as the creator and governor of the universe, and was also considered responsible for most of the teachings of the Old Testament. The Son, Jesus Christ, came to Earth by the will of the Father in order to die for the sins of mankind.⁷ Lastly, the Holy Ghost mediated between man and the Father, and also served as an endowment of spirituality unto the people and the apostles.⁸ In the eyes of the church, the virtuous path consisted solely of devotion to the Trinity, which acted reciprocally and had a loving relationship with man.⁹ Therefore, the church believed that God’s responsibility was to take care of man as long as man fulfilled his responsibility of faith in God, which was necessitated by man’s inability to fully comprehend Him.

Furthermore, the church traced Biblical history through events of faith and service to God. William Backhouse’s conservative account of Biblical history follows this exact trend. For example, Backhouse considered the story of Adam and Eve as the fall of man because they did not trust God and ate the forbidden fruit. His history continued through Moses’ story, which involved Moses attempting to convince the Israelites that

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⁷ Walker, 21-29.
⁸ Walker, 40.
⁹ Dwight, Edwards, and Hickman, 418-419.
he had seen God, but God warned Moses they would not trust him. From there, his history turned to the story of Jeroboam, which discussed a king whose power was threatened by God when he began to worship idols, and restored only after he returns to faith.\textsuperscript{10} The grand event of the history—the sacrifice of Christ—dealt with Christ dying for the sins originally caused by mankind’s lack of faith.\textsuperscript{11} The arch of church history, as manifested by Backhouse, is thus developed through the rise and fall of faith. In the view of the church, faith rooted both the success and punishment given by God to Biblical heroes. The constituency was led to faith as the dominant form of divine worship.

As a qualifier before moving to the Masonic creed, the “Antient Constitutions of the Masons,” “The Constitutions of the Free-Masons” by James Anderson, “Speech Deliver’d to Free and Accepted Masons” by Francis Drake, and “The Spirit of Freemasonry” by William Hutchinson comprehensively detail a full scope of Masonic history, virtues, rules, and practices that were emphasized in the eighteenth century, and thus constitute the foundation of Masonic description and analysis in my work.

\textsuperscript{10} William Backhouse, "The History of the Man of God, Who Was Sent from Judah to Bethel; a Caution against Religious Delusion. A Sermon Preached at the Visitation of the Archdeacon of Ely.," 1763, MS, Bodleian Library (Oxford), Cambridge, Eighteenth Century Collections Online, 4-5, 12.
\textsuperscript{11} Backhouse, 2.
These works are not focused on one particular aspect of Masonry, but instead provide corroborating descriptions of Masonry and give a holistic perspective of the Masonic creed.

Contrary to the position of theologians, Masons linked virtue with science and knowledge rather than solely faith in God. Masons stressed the seven liberal sciences, which they argued fell under the realm of geometry.\textsuperscript{12} Geometry influenced Masonry tremendously because Masons considered it to be the hypostasis of knowledge, and saw its influence on every facet of man’s life.\textsuperscript{13} Thus, Masons united geometry (their paragon of knowledge) with morality, and worshipped God because they considered him the source of this knowledge.\textsuperscript{14} Instead of faith in God, Masonic virtue demanded the comprehension the God’s doctrine and the knowledge of the divine.\textsuperscript{15} Virtue did not operate entirely through God—Masonic beliefs required an active participation from man through science and the association of ideas.

\textsuperscript{12} "The Antient Constitutions of the Free and Accepted Masons, Neatly Engrav'd on Copper Plates. With a Speech Deliver'd at the Grand Lodge at York.," 1731, MS, British Library, London, 3.
\textsuperscript{13} William Hutchinson, "The Spirit of Masonry in Moral and Elucidatory Lectures. By Wm Hutchinson.," 1796, MS, British Library, Carlisle, Eighteenth Century Collections Online, 92-93.
\textsuperscript{14} Francis Drake, "A Speech Deliver'd to the Worshipful and Ancient Society of Free and Accepted Masons. At a Grand Lodge. Held at Merchant's-Hall, in the City of York, on St. John's Day, December 27. 1726.," 1734, MS, British Library, London, Eighteenth Century Collections Online, 15.
\textsuperscript{15} Hutchinson, 94.
Acclaimed as the master Mason and ultimate Architect of the Universe, the Masonic god worked through scientific practice and the organization of matter.\textsuperscript{16} In Masonry, God was praised for his manipulations of matter, such as constructing Adam in “perfect symmetry and beauty.”\textsuperscript{17} The Masonic lodge, which represented God’s architectural creation, also illustrated this Masonic emphasis. In the lodge, Masons were required to contemplate “the great Original” and emulate his knowledge.\textsuperscript{18} Therefore, the Masonic god was composed of science, acting as the instructor of virtue whom Masons were to learn from and emulate. The matter of the lodge and the matter of Adam were the tools of God’s virtue, promoting the same materialism that was prevalent throughout eighteenth-century Europe. Focusing on science and matter, the Masonic deity disregarded the church’s creed of faith. Instead, his responsibility was to teach man.

In place of faith, Masons traced Biblical history by associating themselves with geometrical and scientific acts of Biblical heroes. The Masons’ scientific Biblical history started with the Great Architect, who brought light unto the world.\textsuperscript{19} He then created Adam and passed the source of knowledge down to him in the Garden of Eden. Adam, in turn, passed down the

\textsuperscript{16} Hutchinson, 52.
\textsuperscript{17} Hutchinson, 2.
\textsuperscript{18} Hutchinson, 52.
\textsuperscript{19} Hutchinson, 55.
original knowledge to his children, Cain and Seth, whom eventually passed knowledge down to Moses and the Israelites.²⁰ The application of knowledge to society by Biblical heroes and the succession of knowledge represented the style of Masonic history.²¹ To Masons, the Temple of Jerusalem highlighted the achievements of the ancients, and they described the temple as “connected and framed in true symmetry, beauty, and order.”²² The fact that this temple was built by Solomon, whom the Bible considers the wisest man to ever live, is no coincidence, and Masons “[admired] the sagacity of this pious architect.”²³ In the view of Masons, the application of knowledge to matter and the proliferation of knowledge accounted for the success of Biblical heroes. Masons were thus led to knowledge and its application as the dominant form of worship.

As science replaced faith as an intellectual power, eighteenth-century supporters of republicanism and fraternalism shifted social and political control from the privileged monarchal and clerical elite to a more universal group of men. Freemasons and English Whigs did much to push the tenets of republicanism. Rising as a lowly, persecuted party to the dominant political

²¹ Drake, 17.
²² Hutchinson, 66.
²³ Proverbs 1:20-33 Hutchinson, 85.
party, Whigs carried a strongly republican ideology that favored a more equal system of power opposed to the privileged rule of the past. Whigs also joined Freemason societies and built a strong network, which broadcasted republicanism throughout Europe. Moreover, Freemasonry offered a consistent system of fraternalism—where friendship and discipline were consistently practiced—that could previously only be found in war. Contrasted with the past elite privilege, fraternalism and republicanism placed a greater emphasis on equality wherein every member of society had an active role and deserved to be treated like a brother.\(^\text{24}\)

Eighteenth-century republicanism and fraternalism changed Christian belief by furthering equality in Masonic society. Conservative Christians supported a life of service to God led by the church, and consequently regarded the clergy as superior. In Masonic society, a man could claim to be a Christian while also participating through republican politics and increasing his social value through his personal merit.

As it strictly adhered to faith and love of God, the church also stressed that an ideal life involved service to God through the church. Christian reverend Lancelot Addison defended attacks against the clergy but also detailed the foundation of clerical thought and the justification for clerical privilege. His

\(^{24}\) Jacob, 3, 89, 91-92
work shows the perspective of the church against the radical shift. He argued that once Christ left the world, Christ’s apostles were required to take care of the church in order to establish and advance the gospels.\textsuperscript{25} Service to God, on the part of the church constituency, was thus linked with going to church where the gospels were established. On the part of the clergy, service to God involved establishing and advancing the message of God. The ideal world, in the church’s eyes, would entail both the clergy and constituency regularly going to church in order to establish and advance the gospels.

Because they prioritized service to God, the clergy claimed a naturally superior and privileged role relative to the church constituency. Addison argued that the clergy were selected by divine appointment as Christ’s successors for the purpose of mediating between the people and God.\textsuperscript{26} Moreover, he considered the clergy superior due to this divine appointment: “Because when they were admitted to Holy Orders, they were set apart and devoted to his \textit{Solemn Worship}, and thereby became his more \textit{peculiar Portion}.”\textsuperscript{27} When they did wrong, Addison argued that they should not be held to the standards of the

\textsuperscript{25} Lancelot Addison, "A Modest Plea for the Clergy; Wherein Is Briefly Considered, the Original, Antiquity, and Necessary Use of the Clergy, and the Pretended and Real Occasions of Their Present Contempt.,” 1709, MS, John Rylands University Library of Manchester, London, Eighteen Century Collections Online, .34.

\textsuperscript{26} Addison, 15, 30.

\textsuperscript{27} Addison, 8.
Moreover, he asserted that criticism of the clergy is always fallible: “But whatever was the occasion of the Title of Clergy, its first application to the Ecclesiastique Ministry was Significant and Laudable, not to say Sacred and Divine, and such as even Malice it self can make to Topick to traduce, or contemn those that bear it.”

Thus, taking Addison as a clerical representative, the clergy considered themselves greater than the rest of the church constituency due to their divinely appointed service to God. In effect, this shows that service to God is valued, by the church, as inherently greater than personal merit.

While the clergy considered themselves superior due to divine appointment, Masons promoted equality because they considered merit (through a republican process) as a measure of individual value. To Masons, a man should only be preferred for his “real Worth and personal Merit.” The approval of Masonic masters and wardens was based solely on those two traits. Furthermore, the Masonic hierarchy was designed so that one could not advance until he had reached the level before it, consequently stressing experience as an empirical measure of personal merit. This merit was measured by the opinion of the lodges, which suggests that republicanism to be the proper
system of evaluating merit. By stressing merit and republicanism, Masons endowed each individual with a universal ability to advance and also to evaluate each brother. By giving each individual this power, Masons created a basic social equality.

Rather than establishing and promoting the gospels, Masons put a profound emphasis on fraternalism. Masons believed that God’s judgment was significantly based on social acts, and consequently, mandated their members to practice “Charity, Benevolence, Justice, Temperance, Chastity, and Brotherly Love.” Each of these acts did not have a direct relation with service to the Biblical god. Rather, these notions were fairly secular and mandated service to the fellow man, especially charity, justice, benevolence, and brotherly love. The other notions of temperance and chastity were centered on how the individual should adopt virtues created by the society. Both categories—service to a fellow brother and the adoption of societal virtues—promoted fraternalism. The ideal Masonic world consisted of a fraternal world where brothers helped each other and disciplined each other through the aforementioned virtues in order to create a reciprocal equality among brothers.

Once again contradicting the church, the Masonic focus on brotherly love overtly exemplified Masonic republican and

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31 Anderson, 50-51.
32 Hutchinson, 56.
fraternal practices which illuminated a basic equality among brothers in Masonic society. Republicanism was engrained into Masonic virtues because every brother’s opinion was required be heard with “tenderness and attention,” which gave each individual Mason an incentive for social participation, and thus created a republican society.\(^{33}\) This encouraged fundamental political equality among brothers, as every brother had a political opportunity to participate in the lodge. Furthermore, brothers were also to avoid slander at all times.\(^{34}\) Instead, the “foundation and cape-stone” of Masonry involved speaking well of each other, not hiding each other’s virtues, and doing good deeds to each other.\(^{35}\) If a brother was in trouble, he was to be helped and saved.\(^{36}\) The idea that every brother should treat his fellows with the highest regard is an idea that is rooted in fraternalism. Therefore, Masonic society encouraged social equality because every brother had an equal right to be treated with respect and kindness.

As the power of the Christian orthodoxy eroded, eighteenth-century deism and Masonic Christianity constructed the notion that religion should be liberal. Supporters of naturalism and materialism, though against to the church’s

\(^{33}\) Hutchinson, 127.  
\(^{34}\) Anderson, 56.  
\(^{35}\) Anderson, 56.  
\(^{36}\) Hutchinson, 124.  
\(^{36}\) Hutchinson, 102.
conservative position, did not necessarily divorce themselves from belief in a single creator and instead combined religion with naturalism and materialism. For example, Voltaire’s deism still possessed only one God who gave a general sense of order to the universe, but this god did not play as animated a role as the clerical god. Moreover, most eighteenth-century Masons still regarded themselves as Christians who believed in a single God; however, the Masonic God took the form of a supreme, scientific architect rather than the form of the trinity.\(^{37}\) The Masonic constitution also argued for religious tolerance as long as the individual obeyed an understood moral law.\(^{38}\) Deism and Masonic Christianity, as open interpretations of deity, illustrated that the property of the supernatural escaped the church or any other organized group, and transferred to the individual. Therefore, these philosophies promoted the notion that a more liberal concept of religion was optimal.

A more liberal notion of religion bifurcated Christianity into camps of conservative, elite thought and radically liberal thought. Christian Freemasons showed an acceptance of other religious beliefs while conservative Christians accepted only one true belief. The divide is evidenced by the contrast of religious tolerance between the church’s absolutist writings and Masonic liberal manuscripts.

\(^{37}\) Jacob, 59, 72.  
\(^{38}\) Anderson, 48.
Eighteenth-century conservative Christianity mandated a strict, absolutist interpretation of the Bible. Condemning all other faiths, theologians regarded Christianity as the only acceptable religion to live by: “To say that the Christian Religion is not the most Divine Mystery that ever came into the World, and that all the parts thereof are in themselves the most excellent and sublime, and to Men the most beneficial and agreeable, that ever were made known upon Earth, is as false as its greatest Adversary, the Father of Lyes.”  

Moreover, only one acceptable God existed: “Jesus Christ, the great and heavenly teacher...whose doctrine infinitely surpasses all doctrines and sayings that ever were spoken or written by the wisest of men, repeats and enforces the address of Moses to Israel, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve.”

Furthermore, the church demanded that Christian faith must be practiced in a certain way: “That it was to be publickly celebrated in appointed places, at set times, in prescrip[t] forms, and by select persons.” With only one acceptable religion, one acceptable God, and one acceptable practice of faith, conservative theologians minimized the freedom of religious interpretation given to the church constituency. As a result, they

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39 Addison, 34.
40 Snyder, 10.
41 Addison, 14.
considered all other forms and practices of faith as inferior and promoted an absolutist view of religion.

Adhering to the practice of religious freedom, eighteenth-century Masons allowed for an extraordinary degree of religious tolerance. After tracing the history of the Masons, Anderson’s Constitution addressed the ability of religious freedom that Masons had:

“A Mason is oblig’d, by his Tenure, to obey the moral Law; and if he rightly understands the Art, he will never be a stupid Atheist, nor an irreligious Libertine. But though in ancient Times Masons were charg’d in every Country to be of the Religion of that Country or Nation, whatever it was, yet ‘tis now thought more expedient only to blige them to that Religion in which all Men agree, leaving their particular Opinions to themselves; that is to be good Men and true, or Men of Honour and Honesty, by whatever Denominations of Persausions they may distinguish’d; whereby Masonry becomes the Center of Union, and the Means of conciliating true Friendship among Persons that must else have remain’d at a perpetual Distance.”

In opposition to the church, Masons allowed for religious freedom so as long one believed in a God. Masons did not mandate the Christian faith, faith in the Christian trinity, or any uniform mode of faith. Instead, the Constitution aimed to bring people together of different backgrounds and perspectives as long as they are moral and honorable. The Constitution gave the

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42 Anderson, 48.
individual brother the power to choose his religion, and thus provided a framework for a more liberal concept of religion.

In eighteenth-century Europe, Christian thought changed radically due to the prominence of science, equality, and religious freedom, and there was no longer a singular standard to the Christian life. Masonry offered a hybrid belief, one part founded in the ancient Biblical wisdom of the past, and the other part founded in the radical wisdom of the eighteenth century. In Masonic society, a brother could be both a scientist and a Christian. In Masonic society, a brother could be a Christian and improve his status by merit and practice republicanism in the lodge instead of being subservient to the clergy. In Masonic society, a brother could practice any religion as long as he accepted a common moral law. Masonry networked these principles of science, equality, and religious freedom throughout Europe and effectively dissolved the Christian orthodoxy, replacing it with a radical brotherhood.
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“To regard each other as of one common family”— The Political Ideology of Civil War Soldierhood

by Ethan Scapellati

N.B.: This article is the third chapter of a six-chapter thesis written by Ethan Scapellati for his senior thesis through College Honors and the Department of History at the University of California, Los Angeles under the supervision of Professor and Vice Chair to the Department Joan Waugh. The thesis assesses how, as the Civil War began, the soldiers prosecuting the war brought both religious and political ideologies into their soldierhood. While these motifs derived from a common American heritage dating back to the time of the Founders, the components of these motifs were fractured and highly sectionalized. But as these soldiers’ experiences in the camps and battlefields brought them and their inherent ideologies together, the four years of war saw soldiers influenced by each other’s thoughts and words. The thesis examines religion and politics in America as uniting forces that, together, led to national reunification after the Civil War. This unification trend did not come about with religion or politics exclusively. Rather, the paper argues that the fundamental components comprising American Protestantism and American political ideology fused together to catalyze and strengthen this process. Religious
leaders saw their creed politicized and politicians employed religion to forward their interests. This fusion is an important nuance when assessing the shift from division to unity because, as stand-alone motifs, the essential characteristics of religion and politics in America remained largely unchanged from antebellum America to postbellum America. Christianity still prevailed as a dominating social force and was likewise practiced differently by the North and South in the time of Cleveland and in the time of Buchanan. Similarly, the war did not quell the political-philosophical debates about big and small government, the Constitution, American currency, intervention abroad, and the like. The thesis does not argue that all or even most Americans followed the exact same religious dogma nor that they ascribed to the same political platforms, but rather, that the synthesis between religious and political soldierhood after the war drove American rhetoric, action, and philosophy toward reconciliation and desire for America’s greatness as a unified nation.

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In George Sidney Camp’s 1841 treatise on self-government, entitled *Democracy*, Camp sets forth the essential arguments for the republican form of government being the best earthly manifestation of self-government, the protection of individual freedom. Such a government, Camp argues, is as virtuous as a “fraternizing principle,” where those bound to a
republican polity “are taught by the principles of republicanism to regard each other as of one common family.”¹

These and other elements of what I will define as “republican virtue” served as the basis for a shared political soldierhood throughout the Civil War, particularly for Northern soldiers. In this article, I will expand on this notion of “republican virtue” by assessing its historical progression in America and linking it to historian Joseph Allan Frank’s conception of the American “citizen-soldier.” The citizen-soldier, I will highlight, cultivated in American society through both family and community - a process intrinsically linked to axioms of democracy and self-government. Both contemporary and modern historians and political scientists will be helpful in examining these subjects closely. I will then provide an evaluation of how republican virtue manifested through soldierhood, particularly through facets such as enlistment and voting. I will employ the letters and diaries of soldiers to convey this political soldierhood as well as quotes from the soldiers expressing their commitment to citizenship even as soldiers. Most importantly, in this article I will argue that the shared political soldierhood of Civil War soldiers - in conjunction with the foundations of republican virtue that characterized

antebellum America - would maintain and even strengthen the political egalitarianism that defined the experience of the citizen-soldier.²

Northern soldiers frequently referred to the concept of virtue as being a prominent motivation for fighting. Specifically, I define this specific type of American virtue as “republican virtue,” as developed concurrent with the foundation of the United States. Republicanism in Anglo-American thought has its foundational roots in England with the Radical Whigs. These self-identified republicans believed that the infallibility of the English Parliament subverted the English “natural rights,” or “birthright,” that had taken hold as a philosophical axiom after the Glorious Revolution in 1688. With the joining of Scotland to the English Crown in 1707, Great Britain institutionally established what the Glorious Revolution had implied: monarchism was to be no more in England, and the power of Parliament would see the king operate through this in attempt to secure the English birthright.³ This “glorious Parliament,” perceived to be so in the eighteenth-century English “cult of

² In this article, I often use terms such as “republican virtue,” “political virtue,” and “civic virtue” synonymously. The meaning of these synonymous terms will be explained at the beginning of this article.
³ As argued by English politician Edward Coke, Parliament necessarily had to be given unquestioned, ultimate power to in order to secure these “timeless” rights that guaranteed right to consent, liberty, and property for the English people. See Craig Yirush, “Anglo-American Politics in the Eighteenth Century,” 10 January, 2011.
Parliament,” had no boundaries in its jurisdiction to protect the English “Common Law,” the unwritten code of legal and philosophical frameworks maintaining the English birthright to natural rights.⁴ Colonial and revolutionary Americans rebelled against this unbounded power, drawing upon Radical Whig writings such as, for example, the Cato Letters, a popular piece distributed throughout the colonies starting in the 1720s. Cato’s Letter No. 59, “Liberty proved to be the unalienable Right of all Mankind,” specifically argued that a “power to do good,” such as that of Parliament, “can never become a warrant for doing evil.” Thus, if one deems that a ruling authority is not securing one’s natural rights, one “must act according to the light and dictates of his own conscience, and inform it as well as he can. Where no judge is nor can be appointed, every man must be his own; that is, when there is no stated judge upon earth, we must have recourse to heaven, and obey the will of heaven, by declaring ourselves on that which we think the juster side.” This would lay a foundation for a distinctly American interpretation of natural rights, where the individual liberty could and should be secured by the people to whom these rights are afforded. Thus, the republican virtue that would manifest in antebellum America

spoke to this conception of rights and virtue. These writings laid the foundation for republican virtue, where individual citizenship and personal growth for the betterment of society became a virtuous component of American character. While republicanism had gotten a bad reputation as anarchical after the violent and unstable Cromwell-period of the English Commonwealth in the 1650s (founded under the “Rump Parliament” as an early form of republicanism), American colonists quickly identified republican government and individual virtue as facets that could secure their “natural rights” across the Atlantic better than could Parliament.

No writing echoed this sentiment better than Thomas Paine’s 1770 *Common Sense*. In this work, Paine ridicules monarchy, arguing that the House of Commons existed as the only halfway-legitimate and quasi-representative body of English government. Paine ridiculed hereditary rule (that of the House of Lords) as silly and arbitrary and against the notions of merit-based rule. Americans, he asserted, do *not* need protection from England. Instead, Americans could only exhibit their natural rights to freedom as individuals and appeal to “negative rights” through republican government. Rather than the anarchist labels republicanism had been given since the seventeenth century, Paine illustrates republicanism as the most virtuous

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form of government, a representative politic that allowed for the fostering of virtue. By the 1780s, the debates on how best to craft the American Constitution presented the most coherent manifestation of republican virtue relevant to this article. Government existed in order to foster the best form of citizenry. Thus, the unalienable natural rights afforded to this citizenry were to create representative polities of Americans motivated to take part in the political-civic realm. This would better their own lives and, by extension, that of their neighbors. The Founders and, indeed, the American people by the 1820s overwhelmingly perceived republican form of government to be the most democratic and virtuous in the world. I will argue in this article that these nascent and concrete premises of republican virtue would see an increasing trend toward egalitarianism through the soldierhood of the Civil War, particularly in the Northern armies.

For Civil War soldiers, expert Joseph Allan Frank asserts that republican virtue manifested through the “citizen-soldier.” These soldiers were highly politicized, meaning that

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6 See Thomas Paine, Common Sense in Greene, Colonies to Nation.
political motives for fighting the war were central to their soldierhood. As opposed to the “lifelong vocation” that professional armies had maintained in Europe, the citizen-soldiers were in-tune with their communities, where, as Frank commented, they “acquired a dual role during the revolution and the democratization of politics that followed it” as the “armed manifestation of a political idea.” As both soldiers and citizens, these “citizen-soldiers” participated in the military realm with a distinct sense of republican virtue and, subsequently, the politics of the realm.

As republican virtue sat squarely on the forefront of soldier’s minds, a parallel phenomenon took place throughout the Northern regiments of the war. The citizen-soldier operated in a war containing a noticeable shift from wars like the Mexican-American War that saw a concrete hierarchy of command between officers and soldiers to a significantly increased egalitarianism amongst soldiers of the same regiments. Indeed, historian Earl J. Hess argues that the focus shifted toward the individual in the progression from previous American wars to that of the Civil War. In doing so, egalitarianism became a lasting tenet of America after the war.\(^9\) Democracy and

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\(^{10}\) When I use egalitarianism in this and other instances throughout this article, I mean it to indicate the increased attention to the political voice of the white...
equality became synonymous during this time. More importantly, egalitarianism in the military realm originated in the growing emphasis on egalitarianism for the citizenry, “the people at large,” who believed that opportunity - as with military leadership - should be defined based on merit of intelligence and hard work.¹¹ Because the citizenry were the soldiers, the notions of individualism and equal opportunity operated as democratizing political forces for the Civil War soldiers. The democratic nature of Civil War battalions between the rank-and-file mirrored the democratic essence augmented by republican virtue.

Consequently, these democratic elements would play the role of politicizing the citizen-soldiers throughout the war. While this political-egalitarian component of soldierhood carried over to postbellum America, the antebellum nature of American political citizenry is crucial to an analysis of the citizen-soldier. The men on the front lines - while adopting at least some of the essential traits necessary for effective soldierhood - always

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retained their role as a citizen; that is, the Civil War soldier’s experience in war never eliminated their social and political ties to their communities. The fraternal, literary, entertainment, and religious groups established throughout the camps were directly rooted from their political and social connections to their upbringings in the American-political antebellum realm. This human face to soldierhood stemmed from the long-standing tradition of American communities conditioning its youth to internalize the aforementioned notions of republican virtue and righteousness of democracy. As the citizen-soldier (particularly that of the North) fought in defense of these virtues and of the Constitution, their doing so stemmed from this internalization and its strong foothold in the soldier’s psyche.

This often began in the domestic realm, where antebellum parenting became synonymous with emphasis on American virtue. Historian Jean Baker argues that democratic habit, and tendency toward what I have defined as republican virtue, is not bred naturally but learned. Consequently, women taught their children to be good American citizens as early as the late-eighteenth century when the ideal of the American

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“republican mother” emerged. Sometimes this learned virtue came through indirect ties to the community. For example, William Sylvis, a future infantryman in the Union army from Pennsylvania, was offered employment of odd jobs by a neighbor because of his family’s poverty. This neighbor gave him jobs - often manual labor - that benefited the community because his employer believed in the importance of virtue toward fellow community friends and neighbors. By the time Sylvis had grown older, this virtue defined his political activism as his labor activism influenced many Northern Democrats as they headed off to war in the 1860s.

More often than not, however, the domestic realm directly emphasized these virtues. Contemporary conventional wisdom stressed positive reinforcement of and rewarding for exhibition of good citizenship, seen as effective in producing a genuine internalization of virtuous behavior. Parents employed the help of popular pamphlets, manuals, magazines, and books to do so. Jacob Abbot’s manuals, such as *Duties of Parents*, and books, such as *Fire-side Piety*, were commonly read to children.

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as a means of setting a solid example for the epitome of virtuous behavior. In one instance, Abbott chronicles the actions of one family who receives a wandering stranger into their home: “[The master of the household] gave him a hearty welcome, and the master and his guest entered the dwelling together…the preparations for supper which were going forward, was answering the double purpose of kitchen and parlor…[the family] seemed pleased with the interruption. For if there is true cordial hospitality on this earth, it is to be found in the family of an American farmer.”15 As the antebellum years predated the strong increase in American ethnic heterogeneity through the waves of immigration that the postbellum years would see, the social space of these “old-American communities” necessitated adherence to such ideological tenets. By 1861, soldiers were pressured by their local communities to uphold these tenets of virtue through defense and action in the military realm. For example, neighbors would send lurid women’s undergarments to men if they did not enlist in order to signify a lack of masculinity; during the war, even men’s minute actions on the battlefield were scrutinized by fellow soldiers, especially that of desertion and cowardliness.16 This extended both to the children as well as their parents who were required to instill such virtue.

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Such conformity also demanded distinct American patriotism. From a young age, Americans would hear stories from their parents of American heroes of the Revolution, and battles like Lexington and Concord. Communities held patriotic festivals commemorating America’s founding like July 4th. The communal emphasis on patriotism would be reinforced in the camps and military sphere throughout the war so as to overcome the myriad political attitudes between the soldiers. As soldiers of these democratic virtues fought the war, political dissent persistently had the possibility of forming large cliques of politically disgruntled citizen-soldiers. As historian Reid Mitchell points out, however, Northern soldiers preferred this structure in order to fill the ranks with “intelligent freemen” who “in becoming soldiers…did not cease to be citizens.”

The war’s leaders and military officers employed these shared American values of virtue in order to sustain motivation to continue fighting. The premium on this patriotic component of conformity to republican virtue, moreover, fostered a collective American political-ideological identity that, after the war, cultivated the identity of the American nation that re-tied the bonds of American unity like never before.

Northern regiments would see an unprecedented level of democratization throughout the war, and this would be enacted

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largely through the medium of politicization. The U.S. was founded upon mistrust in the central government. The prevailing importance of a strong national government would lead the U.S. to move away from the militia model that stressed volunteerism exclusive of federal organization and more toward the citizen-soldier model that would come to dominate, which had a strong federal overtone to it. Despite the vast downsizing of the army after the resolution of the war, the role of the citizen-soldier during the war would manifest after the war, particularly in motivating veterans to utilize their citizenship.\textsuperscript{18} This necessitated a stronger importance on nationalism and national centralization.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, the political realm of soldierhood during the Civil War saw a strengthening of the ideals of republican virtue while using those ideals to progress democratization of the citizen’s political agency. Most importantly, in this context, democratization refers to the white Protestant Americans that mainstream American society considered “native” to the American land enshrined in the Declaration of Independence. Accordingly, political democratization came to ferment nationalism for mainstream Americans as \textit{their} republican virtue

\textsuperscript{18} See Frank, \textit{With Ballot and Bayonet}, 7.

\textsuperscript{19} While there was a structural decentralization of regimental organization in the form of local patronage for local politicians, the existing aura of the federal government and its role in regulating this would come to stay on the minds of the average American. Once again, McPherson, \textit{Battle Cry of Freedom}, Chapter 10 provides further distinction on the importance of federal organization of troops.
laid claim to equal political access. How did this political egalitarianism manifest specifically in Civil War soldierhood? The following section will present some examples of this manifestation.

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Northern soldiers saw the preservation of self-government as essential for a better future for the country and, even, for the world. Building on the essence of natural rights that helped shape the republican Constitution, historian and political scientist George Sidney Camp asserts that, while free, men “likewise have reason and conscience incorporated in their natures, which teach them to be rationally and morally free.” While freedom and “birthright” are tremendously important, the moral manifestation of such freedom - Camp argues - necessitates a state to control and allow for such freedom. The only just state, therefore, could be of one run by these free people. Thus, such self-government, that of “free and deliberate opinion,” is “that of a community of individuals voluntarily agreeing where the limit prescribed by the natural or moral law to their respective private wills is to be fixed.” Camp clarifies this by adding that, “as man requires civil government only by

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20 See Frank, With Ballot and Bayonet, 62-63, for an evaluation and confirmation of this being the case for both the North and the South, where these ideals were founded upon a belief in each government’s constitutions.

21 Camp, Democracy, 41. See pages 42-46 for a further explanation on freedom and its relation to community.
virtue of his rational and moral nature, and as by that rational and moral nature he is essentially a self-governing being, self-government by the people is the only legitimate form of civil government.”

Furthermore, Camp’s assessment of republicanism links self-government with the aforementioned notions of republican virtue. As Camp asserts that the “law of justice between man and man establishes the republican principle,” Americans accordingly have a practical stake in the maintenance of republican self-government for their own benefit; republicanism relies only upon “the union of the virtuous impulses of a moral nature with the strong motives of a personal interest” for an effective “state of combination.” But more importantly, Camp argues that, as the “just is nothing but the equal,” republicanism results in “invariable equality.” Republican government of self-governance, he argues, is that which is best for nurturing virtuousness of man. Thus, the state became enormously important for the progression of virtue in so that democratization of the politics of virtuous men exhibits itself in self-government. Indeed, soldiers took to arms in order to defend this. Captain George S. Avery of the Third Missouri Cavalry (U.S.) wrote to his future wife, for example, that “our Country has the first right

22 Ibid., 57, 53-54.
23 Camp, Democracy, 103-104.
24 Ibid., 54.
[on me] & I am ready to say that Lizzie has [only] the next.”

The cause for maintenance of these values was the utmost concern for Northern soldiers, a product of the internalization and the reinforcement of patriotism to the sacred state.

Internalized political virtue had a strong influence on soldiers’ enlistment. As mentioned earlier in the article, there existed a progression throughout the war of the Union’s tendency toward a strong federal role in enlistment instead of local militia. While conscription became an arguably necessary component of this enlistment, the duty to uphold republican virtue would see soldiers throughout the war volunteer to enlist. For some, like that of the Twentieth Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry (better known as the “Harvard Regiment”), patriotism infused with a youthful hunger to uphold the virtue that had so recently been learned at home: “The college is full of the spirit of war & indignant of the treatment of the country’s

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25 Quoted in Frank, With Ballot and Bayonet, 22.
26 Still, that is not to trivialize the importance of states and citizens’ loyalty to their states. Rather than leave states responsible to organize local militia, however, the federal government took a more active role in guiding state enlistment and recruitment policies.
27 See Frank, With Ballot and Bayonet, 6-8, for the importance of volunteerism to Northern Civil War soldiers and its contrast to other examples. Frank notes that only five to seven percent of Northern combatants were conscripts, adding to the assertion that volunteerism in the North was prevalent and foundational to the Union’s cause.
flag.” The Twentieth Massachusetts, known to be a “Copperhead Regiment” for their rejection of war for abolition, still recognized the political virtue in patriotism that motivated them to enlist.

In the same vein, the Second Rhode Island’s Elisha Hunt Rhodes’s mother exhibited the character of the “republican mother” of virtue. After having initially “refused her consent” to allow her son to enlist, Rhodes recorded that her “sacrifice” to change her mind in support of his “duty” reflected a “patriotic spirit that much inspired [his] heart.” Even later in the war, Charles Haydon of the Second Michigan Volunteer Infantry adamantly reenlisted after suffering a severe wound. Writing on January 3, 1864, Haydon noted that the other reenlisting soldiers kept up “good spirits & many more are willing to reenlist” than he would have surmised “under the circumstances” of the Second Michigan’s Volunteer Infantry loss of 93 men after the Confederate siege of Knoxville. These good spirits caused Haydon to remark, “I wonder at the fidelity & patriotism of the men.”

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in the egalitarianism evaluated earlier in the article. Northern Soldiers often chose to enlist explicitly to rebut the Southern claim of Northern elitism and lack of virtue. This saw, as Lincoln himself commented, the “middle classes” and “working people” enlist to convey the democratization and universality of virtue that the North’s cause represented. Soldiers’ attention to virtue ingrained in their enlistment justified the Union cause and, more importantly, strengthened the unity of the Union. This would prove to be very important after the war. With victory, the prevailing Northern attitude toward liberty and virtue as universal won over the Southern application of liberty to their own specific means. As historian Chandra Manning quotes of Kansas private Leigh Webber, Union soldiers fought “for the Cause of Constitutional Liberty” because “if we fail now, the hope of human rights is extinguished forever.”

In order to retain soldiers’ keenness to re-enlist upon termination of their tour, companies and regiments would play up the virtues of their recruits’ respective communities. Many soldiers would agree with one sergeant of the First Minnesota Volunteer Infantry: “[I] would rather be a private in this regiment than a captain in any that I know of.” Most regiments


carried battlefield flags containing insignias symbolic or representative of their hometowns, often knitted by neighborhood women. Though incidental and often confusing, uniforms themselves commonly varied according to the local community that made them, further emphasizing the role soldiers’ communities had in their daily lives as soldiers. A soldier’s company or regiment provided him with his day-to-day peers and closest friends. The strong influence of soldiers’ home communities upon their soldierhood in fact contributed to general and unifying influences of virtue and egalitarianism prevalent throughout the war.

The most prominent manifestation of political soldierhood and attention to virtue came through the vehicle of the 1864 election. As the Democratic candidate - former lead Union General George B. McClellan - campaigned on a platform of peace and end to the war, the fate of the election coincided with the fate of the war and, with that, the Union. The fortunes for a second term of President Abraham Lincoln (running on the “Union” ticket rather than the “Republican” ticket that he still identified with) did not starkly differ than that for McClellan: success in the Election of 1864 would be centrally tied to the success or failure of Union troops throughout 1864. For

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Lincoln himself did not believe he would win the Election before August, as the prosecution of the war in 1864 left few positive chords with Americans. The President even issued a blind letter to his cabinet detailing what to do when
soldiers, the election did more than help determine policy. The election called for the citizen-soldier to display their republican virtue and answer the call of civic duty through voting and participation in the political process. This attention to political virtue acted as a vehicle for political unity, and soldiers responded accordingly.

The act of voting itself indicated the importance of equal political access to soldiers. Historian Josiah Henry Benton highlighted in his work on Civil War soldier voting, *Voting in the Field*, that a soldier did not have “any right to vote except by the Constitution and the law of the State where he lives…When the war broke out there was no legislation under which a soldier or sailor, having the right to vote in an election district of any State could vote anywhere outside of his district.” Because it seemed “unfair” that “the man who was qualified to vote at home should be disqualified merely because he was out of the State fighting,” state legislatures as early as 1861 took up the task of drafting legislation to reconcile this dilemma.34

The element of “fairness” within these voting methods included that of democracy. Where the issue started as one of *where* one voted, spatial barriers gave way to the importance of

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political egalitarianism for voters everywhere.\textsuperscript{35} The two primary methods of voting in the field were the utilization of the ballot box directly in the camps (as if the camps spatially represented their home states) as well as “proxy voting,” where ballots were sent to the soldier’s state and would count as if they were voting from within their state.\textsuperscript{36} For example, the state of Massachusetts passed, by a “yea and nay vote of 163 to 4” on May 11, 1864, a draft resolution stating that “any qualified voter of this Commonwealth [of Massachusetts] who is absent in the time of war in the military or naval service of the United States may vote in the choice of any officers that may be voted for at a general election.”\textsuperscript{37} Likewise, New York saw such considerations in the state Legislature as early as 1863 when, on April 15, the Attorney General commented on a proposed bill to allow soldiers to vote while absent from the state: “[Soldiers] clearly need not offer [their votes] with his own hand, for the sick and infirm and paralyzed may vote, and so may the soldier or

\textsuperscript{35} Benton highlights on pages 306-308 of \textit{Voting in the Field} that Democrats almost unilaterally opposed soldiers’ votes from the field, and indeed, no Democratic legislature ever passed such a bill.

\textsuperscript{36} Benton, \textit{Voting in the Field}, 15.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 295. It is important to note, as Benton does, that the failure of publication of the “resolve” ultimately led to the failure of the state of Massachusetts to properly give Massachusetts soldiers the ability to vote in 1864. For the purposes of this chapter, however, the intent by the Massachusetts Legislature to provide such right conveys the sentiments of political democratization that would manifest after the war. See Benton, \textit{Voting in the Field}, Chapter 28 for a chronicling of this vote in the Massachusetts state government.
sailor…The elector is abroad, but he is still regarding by the Constitution as a resident of his election district…”

These voting methods and legislative sentiments were a clear indication that soldiers looked to uphold their status as *citizen-soldiers* through participation in the general election. Soldierhood had the twofold dimension of the military realm as well as the political realm. The political-civic component of republican virtue would, accordingly, exhibit both within their communities and on the battlefield. After the war, the egalitarianism that comprised the shared political soldierhood of Civil War soldiers would manifest in Americans’ desire for political participation as per the structure of self-government that already existed. Just as soldiers clamored to make their voices known in 1864, citizens after the war fervently advocated for and participated in high-voter turnout and mass participation in local, state, and especially national politics. Even during the war, in cases where states were slow to institute soldier-voting rights like Illinois, soldiers would conduct popular and publicly issued straw polls.

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39. Lincoln’s own term for these politicized soldiers was “thinking bayonets,” which he depended on to win the election. See Manning, *Cruel War*, 148-193, generally.
This premium on the act of voting was eminent through the statements of (then) Brigadier General Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain of the Twentieth Maine Volunteer Infantry. In response to his men’s desire and action to vote for Lincoln, Chamberlain commented that they “felt that they were part of the very people whose honor and life they were to maintain…this vote showed how much stronger their allegiance to principle than ever their attachment to McClellan…”\footnote{Quoted in John J. Pullen, \textit{The Twentieth Maine} (1957; reprint Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2008), 231-232.} Similarly, Elisha Hunt Rhodes recorded on the day of the election, November 8, that “For three days it has rained and we have been under arms every morning at daylight waiting for the enemy to appear.” Despite these difficulties, the Second Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry held a regimental election.\footnote{Rhodes, \textit{All for the Union}, 196. Rhodes adds that “Lincoln of course is the favorite with the soldiers [of the regiment]” in the same diary entry.} Soldiers were prepared to vote in the face of danger and difficulty in order to display their citizenship and patriotism that had been so deeply ingrained in antebellum America.

The commitment to upholding political virtue was further echoed in Wilbur Fisks’s recordings of the “great political contest” - of which he asserted on October 12, 1864 that to “fight this thing out” was the surest way to prevent the rebels
from thinking they were “weary of war.” Wilbur Fisk chronicled election day as one where the soldiers, “instead of huddling into their tents, driven there by the cold, are gathered in knots in their company streets discussing politics and other grave questions of the hours, and performing the by no means unimportant duty of casting their votes for men and principles…” Wilbur Fisk’s diary entries are but another indication that soldiers’ willingness to answer their civic duties and uphold the virtue they had grown up being taught came from their roles as citizens. Accordingly, these men did not see their service in the military realm as one that excused them of upholding such virtue, and their political participation reflected this. After the war, citizens would retain the political inclination toward participation and civic virtue in the belief that it would collectively better their communities and the newly unified nation.

When General John Bell Hood evacuated Atlanta on September 1, 1864, General William Tecumseh Sherman’s taking of the city prompted McClellan to renounce the “four years of failure” plank of his campaign and instead focus on the

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44 Ibid., 273. On page 276, Fisk notes that the current final vote of 1114 votes in his brigade was 764 for Lincoln and 350 for McClellan; he details with pride that his regiment, the “banner regiment,” voted 175 for Lincoln, 7 for McClellan.
“Peace Platform” due to the jubilance and sudden overwhelming, Republican-led support for the Union war effort. The latter differed from the former in its commemoration and recognition of the soldiers’ efforts to carry out their civic responsibility as citizens of their nation and as courageous men of their time. Campaign rallies played on Sherman’s and other recent Union successes, utilizing popular songs and poems such as Thomas B. Read’s “Sheridan’s Ride” after the battle of Cedar Creek. Republicans also took advantage of the recent surge in support for the Union war effort to point out threats of Democratic rebellion in the North - most notably, that of the “Order of American Knights” and the border raids of William Clarke Quantrill and “Bloody Bill” Anderson in Missouri. Lincoln defeated McClellan in the Electoral College 212 to 21. In the nineteen states that had legislatively approved of soldiers voting in the field, Lincoln carried 78% of the soldier vote, compared to 53% of civilians from those same states.

In this article, I used republican virtue as the animating force of political soldierhood. The essential principles of self-government and democracy came to play defining roles in the Northern soldier’s political soldierhood. Ultimately, the political egalitarianism and unity through political participation that this

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46 Ibid., 804-805. This overwhelming soldiers’ support for Lincoln foreshadows the loyalty to the Union - and, for the purposes of my argument, eventual unity - that would prevail in postbellum America.
evidence suggests would have a direct influence in the nature of politics in postbellum America. The most important consequence of this influence would be the ultimate unity characterizing the country - most notably by the election of 1884; this was primarily due to the egalitarian disposition of political soldierhood.
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by Benjamin Steiner

For generations Jews have pondered the implications of women’s exclusion from religious authority. Indeed, for a century before a Jewish feminist movement burst forth in the 1970s, the ethical imperative of equality weighed on the sentiments of such prominent reformers as Rabbis David Einhorn and Isaac Mayer Wise. A hundred years before feminist critics Judith Plaskow and Rachel Adler famously vocalized their concerns, Einhorn insisted that Judaism enact “complete religious equality of the female sex.”¹ Rabbi Wise similarly proclaimed that Judaism embraced a God who “made man, male and female, and both in his own image, without any difference in regard to duties, rights, claims, and hopes.”² Generally, however, these statements were rhetorical flourishes with few practical ramifications; the pressures of secular social mores weighed against dramatic reform. Only when a feminist revolution arose in secular America could a religious feminist movement hope to recraft the contours of Jewish observance, as women linked arms in protest. By the early 1970s, just such a consciousness began to

² Ibid. 19.
Jewish feminists thus succeeded where previous generations had failed to affect transformation—crossing from different centers of energy and determination, they now came together in sisterhood to challenge their historic marginality.

While Jewish feminist matriarchs uniformly favored women’s equality, their understandings of that equality differed. This paper addresses the evolution of the multifaceted Jewish feminist conversation from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s. This journey begins with Rachel Adler’s much publicized, blistering critique of traditional Judaism in the pages of *Davka* in 1971; it then examines Saul Berman’s often-cited Orthodox response. The paper moves on to Cynthia Ozick’s provocative assessment, and continues with Blu Greenberg’s *On Women and Judaism*. It concludes with articles by Judith Plaskow and Rachel Adler that display a definitive shift towards theology as Jewish feminists began to craft new conceptions of divinity.

By the early 1970s, percolating Jewish feminist sentiment blossomed into a conversation. Rachel Adler’s 1971 essay, “The Jew Who Wasn’t There: Halakhah and the Jewish Woman” underscores what for her are the painful manifestations of Judaism’s male bent. For Adler, a traditional Jew, the problem was deeply rooted in *halakha*. Women are subordinated, ignored, and tangential to *halakhic* discourse; they wallow in inescapable

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3 Jewish law
otherness, as they endure a system manufactured solely by men. Adler says of the Jewish woman, “[i]t is time for the Golem to demand a soul”—a true place within the Covenant—and *halakha* must conform to her demands. It is with the sentiments of Adler that our tale shall begin. Women, however, came to Jewish feminism from diverse places. Some, like Adler, discovered it through a deep sense of *halakhic* injustice. Others came to it through the absence of women’s voices in the Jewish tradition. All insisted that Judaism answer to the feminist critique. When Adler penned her words, others had begun to broach similar Jewish questions, as secular feminism ignited religious discourse. If Betty Freidan’s *Feminine Mystique* was a harbinger for the secular feminist movement in 1963, Adler’s own criticisms heralded the emergence of Jewish feminism a decade after.

Adler was not the first to sense injustice, but she wrote as if she were alone, convinced she was “a solitary madwoman.” Today, it is difficult to fully appreciate this sense of suffocating isolation, because the Jewish landscape has shifted so dramatically in the intervening decades. Today’s Jewish

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feminists stand on the shoulders of their predecessors, engaged in Jewish practice forever changed by the initiative of previous generations. Gone, it seems, are the days when women were “denied knowledge of their history, [forced] to argue as though no woman before her had ever thought or written…to use their energy to reinvent the wheel, over and over again, generation after generation.”6 Today there are communities where men and women labor collectively to engender Judaism, both in liberal and in traditional communities.7 Yet Adler wrote before any Jewish women’s movement existed, and before any sort of collective awareness solidified. Adler’s polemics evince ambivalence over whether Judaism could adapt, whether it could jettison its patriarchy and embrace egalitarian sensibilities. Could Judaism withstand the battering rams of feminist criticism?

Many women experienced cognitive dissonance between their allegiance to feminism and their adherence to Judaism. At the first National Jewish Women’s Conference, convened in 1973, this tension seethed. It was there that Judith Plaskow fittingly spoke of “The Jewish Feminist: Conflict in Identities,” of women seeking deeper meaning. “It seems to me that the identity of the Jewish woman…lies somewhere in the conflict

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7 Judith Plaskow, Personal interview. 18 Dec. 2011. The interview was conducted at Manhattan College, in New York City.

between being a woman and being a Jew and in the necessity of combining the two in as yet unknown ways,” she preached. In articulating her sentiments, Plaskow was driven chiefly by developments within the feminist movement in the United States—specifically consciousness raising, which was then popular amongst women in America seeking to explicate the root of their oppression. Through such experiences—unmediated by men—women could similarly extricate themselves from Judaism’s undesired patriarchy.

Also in 1973, Orthodox Rabbi Saul Berman addressed the growing tension between feminism and Judaism, lest, he feared, feminist intellectual currents gain momentum. His article in Tradition, “The Status of Women in Halakhic Judaism,” advocates a conciliatory posture towards feminism. Berman demands a moratorium on apologetics, and breathing space for women within Jewish law. He writes:

we must encourage women to develop in a creative fashion whatever additional forms they find necessary for their religious growth…[t]heir practices might involve their own form of public worship to follow and supplement the standard service, but expressive of women's sensitivities. It might involve the creation of new religious artifacts or of new patterns of communal study. Only one thing is certain, and that is that the creative religious energies of Jewish women remain a

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major source of untapped strength for the Jewish community as a whole, and those energies must be freed.\footnote{Saul J. Berman, “The Status of Women in Halakhic Judaism.” Tradition: A Journal of Orthodox Jewish Thought 14.2 (Fall 1973), pp. 5-28.}

Indeed, as Berman wrote, each denomination had embarked on a process to unleash women’s energies. In Reform Judaism, after a tumultuous journey which culminated a century of debate, Sally Priesand was ordained as the first American woman rabbi in 1972. The same year, Ezrat Nashim,\footnote{A reference to the women’s section of the traditional Jewish synagogue, or “women’s help” if translated literally.} a small but determined group of nine religious feminists, issued its call to change to the Rabbinic Assembly of the Conservative movement,\footnote{Conservative Judaism inhabits the center of the Jewish theological spectrum, embracing both a commitment to modernity and the Jewish legal process. The Rabbinical Assembly is the central law-crafting body of the movement.} helping to ignite a decade of debate over women’s ordination in that denomination. By 1973, women could count in Conservative minyanim by decree of the Rabbinical Assembly. Even the Orthodoxy\footnote{Here capitalized, I reference the rightward-most denomination of American Judaism.} Berman describes was part of the debate. In 1972, Yeshiva University, the leading institution of American Modern Orthodoxy, began teaching Talmud to women, in what helped catalyze a revolution in women’s religious learning. These disparate bureaucratic decisions bespeak an awakening of a Jewish feminist awareness; their simultaneity echoes the
feminist sentiment brewing at the time. At precisely the moment when Adler penned her critique, however, her stinging words reflected women’s limited Jewish options across the denominational spectrum, as gender inequality remained largely normative even in liberal congregations and ritual authority remained the province of men.

Adler presented Judaism with a *halakhic* critique (if not a *halakhic* question) that traditional Judaism would have to address; the problems she raised would not disappear simply because they were ignored. Redress would only come from drastic change to Jewish law. In truth, the nascent ideas expressed in “The Jew Who Wasn’t There” evince a more polemical than a pragmatic character. Thus, while Adler’s nascent writings may have rallied an indignant protest, it is Cynthia Ozick’s work which would come to further shape the debate. Her 1979 article, “Notes toward Finding the Right Question,”\(^{13}\) galvanized Adler’s turbulent sentiments into an intellectual project, bequeathing feminists greater conceptual tools with which to address their religious concerns. In so doing, it referenced the debate which Adler helped to kindle. Ozick’s analysis poses the challenge: “what exactly is the question?” She writes, “[t]he danger of the present discussion—the relation of

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women to the Jewish Way—is that the wrong question will be asked, inexorably leading to answers that are as good as lies.”¹⁴ Feminism must elicit the right questions if it expects to elicit acceptable answers.

The wrong question, for her, is the theological one. For Ozick, theology is a quintessentially Christian undertaking. As she notes, “Eve, the bad woman, is theologically crucial to the survival and continuation of Christianity. Eve, the bad woman, is irrelevant to the survival and continuation of Judaism.” So why link Ozick to the evolution of Jewish feminist theology? Ozick’s essay became a conduit for the theological discussion that succeeded it—a medium through which the creative energies of other feminists emerged. As Melissa Raphael, the feminist theologian, aptly states, “[h]er prophetic rhetoric was a fanfare for the opening of the Jewish feminist project.”¹⁵ Without these pioneering prophets, each steering a different avenue of feminist critique, feminist Jewish theology would never, could never, have emerged. These essential articles and voices carried the conversation further. Jewish feminism has always been a process of tugging—tugging at Judaism’s edges so that new questions might be asked—and new boundaries constructed. That Ozick

¹⁴ Ozick, 120.
flatly rejects theology as a means of Jewish discourse\textsuperscript{16} gives space to others to conceptualize God in the Jewish feminist context.

“Notes” does address problems intrinsic to Jewish tradition, despite its anti-theological thrust. While steeped in immutable notions of justice, Ozick laments, the Torah lacks one pivotal axiom to purge misogyny from history, a single commandment to complete the Covenant. “There is no mighty ‘thou shalt not lessen the humanity of women!’ to echo downward from age to age,”\textsuperscript{17} she thunders. “In one remarkable instance only there is lacking the cleansing force of ‘Thou shalt not,’ and the abuses of society are permitted to have their way almost unchecked by Torah.”\textsuperscript{18} Ozick’s argument is generally interpreted as a sociological and not a biblical critique.\textsuperscript{19} For her the problem is rabbinic interpretation and not the Torah own mistaken theological thrust. The rabbis have misinterpreted divine directive, inculcating women’s subordination. However, the author ultimately seems conflicted about the role of patriarchy in the Torah’s very axioms. In rendering the biblical text incomplete, her criticism seems to branch in two directions. Ozick the sociological reformer might be equally characterized

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{16} Ozick, 122.
\item\textsuperscript{17} Ozick, 149.
\item\textsuperscript{18} Ozick, 146.
\item\textsuperscript{19} Susannah Heschel, ed. \textit{On Being a Jewish Feminist: A Reader} (New York: Schocken Books, 1995), 115.
\end{itemize}
as a theological revolutionary. Is the Torah the problem? Ozick appears conflicted.

As she voiced her concerns, Jewish feminism expanded its scope and began to encompass more traditional religious forms. The culmination of a decade of writing and introspection, Blu Greenberg’s 1981 treatise *On Women and Judaism: A View from Tradition* moves the conversation from specific halakhic critiques to a broader appraisal of the halakhic process. Rabbis have for millennia adapted Judaism to contemporary circumstances, and now must be no exception, she argues. The book appeared well before Plaskow, Adler, or Ross published their completed theological formulations. Yet, while it is not a work of theology per se, *On Women and Judaism* paved the way for theology to come, by elucidating that halakha could adapt to feminist concerns. Judaism, she conveys, can be made safe for women: “[t]hroughout the centuries, Judaism generated revolutionary ethical teachings. Why will it not incorporate the lessons of feminism?” Although the argument is largely undeveloped, Greenberg begins a conversation about feminism within the context of tradition. She calls for a halakhic way into feminist discourse.

Following the publication of Greenberg’s foundational work, feminists made gains and encountered backlash. In 1983, the Rabbinical Assembly of the Conservative movement voted to
admit women to the rabbinical school. In the Jewish feminist community, the resolution elicited fanfare. “We all went out for dinner the night the change was announced. We did it. This small group of women (Ezrat Nashim) changed Judaism,”\textsuperscript{20} Plaskow would later reflect. Yet the decision dismayed many. Since Ezrat Nashim’s appeal to Conservative Judaism for change in the early 1970s, the denomination had struggled to balance its engagement with modernity with its commitment to tradition. The ordination of women rabbis proved a tipping point at the seminary. It catalyzed an exodus of faculty and provoked rupture in the denomination: “Let us not make ourselves objects of derision and jest”\textsuperscript{21} noted Talmudist Rabbi Saul Lieberman wrote with resolve against women’s ordination. Yet “[i]n the end, they (the women who would be rabbis) and their collective body of supporters affirmed that no matter how long Conservative elites denied women the opportunity to serve their people as rabbis, the question would remain open.”\textsuperscript{22} Ultimately, a swelling of grassroots activism forced the hand of the seminary. Now it was up to the first generation of women rabbis to transform tradition from within.

Also in Orthodoxy, opposition to feminist objectives erupted. In 1984, five prominent faculty members of the Rabbi

\textsuperscript{20} Plaskow, Judith. Personal interview. 18 Dec. 2011
\textsuperscript{22} Pamela S. Nadell, \textit{Women Who Would Be Rabbis}, 197.
Yitzchak Elchanan Seminary (RIETS) of Yeshiva University in New York City forbade women’s prayer groups in a unified declaration. The “REITS 5” pronouncement sent ripples of anti-feminist sentiment throughout the Orthodox world. And while others rabbis emerged in spirited defense of women’s *minyanim*, perhaps most troubling to feminists was that this remained a conversation between men, dictating women’s place in Judaism: “[For] both the defenders of women graciously adducing permissions and the censorious opponents amassing prohibitions and stringencies—the notion of a *halakhic* vacuum in which women are free of any authority but their own seems the most intolerable possibility of all,” Adler would bitterly lament. For her, this was classic rabbinic discourse, at times antagonistic toward and at times supportive of women’s concerns, but always neglectful of women’s voices.

Amidst these denominational developments, American Judaism actually experienced a steady decline in denominational affiliation. Looking forward to 2004, as the fixed boundaries between the liberal denominations diminished, Reform Rabbi

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Paul J. Menitoff, executive vice-president of the Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR), actually predicted the demise of the Conservative movement, once the largest sect of American Judaism but now in a state of contraction.\textsuperscript{26} Explicating this phenomenon, Dana Evan Kaplan writes that a new generation of Jews, “[i]s much less likely to simply accept the traditions that they were taught by their parents. Rather, they want to experience intense spirituality and will undertake a serious search for it if they do not feel it exists in their present religious environment.”\textsuperscript{27} Thus, as Adler and Plaskow began to develop their respective theological paradigms, it is fair to say that they did so with an increasing sense of empowerment; there was a growing realization amongst feminists that they could do Judaism for themselves, outside the purview of traditional, denominationally-based authority. Two essential articles published in 1983 evince this changing sentiment.

The first, a response to Ozick and Adler, articulates Judith Plaskow’s profound feminist critique of Judaism. Her essay, “The Right Question is Theological,”\textsuperscript{28} deems halakhic change insufficient, because the deeper blasphemy is Judaism’s patriarchal conception of deity. For Plaskow, misogyny ensues

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} Ibid. 109.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Dana Evan Kaplan, \textit{Contemporary American Judaism}, 62.
\end{itemize}
from Judaism’s very core and not just its legal minutiae. “The Jewish women’s movement of the past decade…has focused on getting women a piece of the Jewish pie; it has not wanted to bake a new one,”\textsuperscript{29} she famously decries. In contradistinction to Ozick, Plaskow dauntlessly brands the Torah an androcentric construction. She posits that for too long the Jewish God has been man’s justification for larger patterns of male domination.”\textsuperscript{30} As God transcends Man, she critiques, so too man must transcend woman.\textsuperscript{31} Long maligned, women must now become partners in the sacred by transforming Judaism’s conception of deity.

A second article, Adler’s “I’ve Had Nothing Yet So I Can’t Take More,” similarly evinces the beginnings of a renewed vision for Judaism. Where Plaskow talks about God, however, Adler mainly dissects the deficiencies of Judaism’s halakhic system. The problem is less the religion’s conception of deity and more its understanding of covenant. Judaism must free itself of slavish devotion to legal anachronism—what she terms “methodolatry.”—and mold itself to contemporary circumstance. This is because, as Adler contends, “[p]atriarchal methods…

\textsuperscript{29} Plaskow, “The Right Question is Theological,” 223.
\textsuperscript{30} Plaskow, \textit{The Coming of Lilith}, 77.
\textsuperscript{31} Here, Plaskow is informed by the work of Christian feminist Mary Daly, who articulates that “if God is male then male is God.” See Mary Daly, \textit{Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women’s Liberation} (Boston: Beacon, 1973), 19.
have obliterated women’s own questions about the sanctification of their experience.”\footnote{Rachel Adler, “I’ve Had Nothing Yet So I Can’t Take More.” \textit{Moment} 8 (September 1983), 24.} Thus, rape becomes for the Torah a question of monetary devaluation and compensation instead of a woman’s anguish. For Adler, “The choice of problems to be addressed is determined by the method, rather than the method being shaped to address questions.”\footnote{Ibid.} How could Judaism recraft these archaic pretenses? We might infer that men and women would need to engender a new covenant, one which elevates the feelings and concerns of all Jews, man and woman alike. Adler thus conveys some of the methodological suppositions that would inform her later opus, \textit{Engendering Judaism}. However, echoing Susannah Heschel, she remained at that time troubled by Judaism’s “morbid condition” in the modern period—that is, its inability to adapt to contemporary circumstances.

Whatever their dissatisfactions with Judaism, Plaskow, Adler and Ozick still left room in their lives for the very textual tradition that renders them ‘invisible’ to Judaism. Even Plaskow, who criticizes Adler and Ozick, who “seem not to have fully understood…that the otherness of women will disappear if only the community is flexible enough to rectify halakhic injustices,” recognizes the depth of Jewish legal tradition. “The decisions to struggle with Torah, to criticize it, to remain in relation to it, all
presuppose a more complex attitude,” she writes. Indeed, for all of these feminists, texts provide a medium for dialogue despite their patriarchic bias. This is essential, because as Ellen Umansky reflects in her 1984 article “Creating a Jewish Feminist Theology: Possibilities and Problems,” the feminist theologian who embraces Judaism must inherently navigate the chasm between personal experience and tradition:

Any feminist theology that identifies itself as Jewish acknowledges an *a priori* commitment to Jewish tradition… What distinguishes a Jewish feminist theologian from a feminist theologian who sees herself as post-Jewish or Jewish raised, is that the latter can open herself to all forms of religious experience and self-expression, but the former, by choosing to identify herself and her visions as Jewish, attempts to place her experiences of the Divine within a specifically Jewish framework.35

By this articulation, for example, Eastern Goddess imagery fails the test of Jewish authenticity.36 If Jewish feminists seek transformation, there are limits to the scope of change. The Pentateuch and its commentary constitute the fundamental medium of Jewish discourse; Jewish experience severed from

34 Plaskow, *The Coming of Lilith*, 77.
Torah cannot long remain within the faith. If anything, Torah expresses what Plaskow terms a “partial record of the ‘God-wrestling’ of part of the Jewish people”\textsuperscript{37} that can never be fully eschewed.

We have just traced the initial stages of a discussion, staged in fringe magazines, mainstream publications, and anthologies, which chart the course of future discourse. We can characterize Adler, Ozick, Plaskow and the others as matriarchs, forging new paths for future generations. Adler’s growls inspired a movement. Ozick transformed that movement into an intellectual project. Greenberg began a conversation about feminism’s relationship with \textit{halakha} more broadly. Finally, Plaskow and Adler pushed that project succinctly in the theological direction. In each text, we witness the development of a dynamic women’s voice for change, in each text a call for renewal. Yet while they inform each other, these texts also emerge from a historical context. The development of the discourse from initial anger to later, more productive interaction with Judaism parallels the evolution of Judaism itself. By 1983, all denominations had addressed women’s legal inequality. That Plaskow and Adler began to articulate themselves in theological terms bespeaks the formative impact of these changes. This heralded the beginning of a second wave of Jewish feminist

\textsuperscript{37} Plaskow, \textit{Standing Again at Sinai}, 33.
thought, one characterized by the emergence of feminist theologies, and with them woman-centered analyses of Judaism.

Thus, feminism’s interaction with Judaism began with rebellion. Yet despite their dissatisfaction with the faith, our protagonists each grappled with the ramifications of Torah and its male-constructed commentary. There exists tension between the desire for radicalism and the yearning for accommodation, a longing for community despite its patriarchy. For Adler and Ozick, this means seeking new halakhic interpretations to assist Jewish-feminist reconciliation. And although Plaskow questions the efficacy of such tactics—even the very capacity of halakha to rectify women’s subordination—she too wrestles with the implications and importance of Torah; Plaskow clings to tradition even as she purges its patriarchal focus. The academic Rochelle L. Millen concludes, “law…together with liturgy and language constitutes the foundation upon which the multistoried building of Jewish feminist theory continues to be constructed.” If something is rotten in Eden, then Torah, broadly speaking, is equally the cause and the solution to Judaism’s patriarchal woes—ultimately, there is little alternative.

38 Rive-Ellen Prell, Women Remaking American Judaism, 9.
39 Tamar Ross, Expanding the Palace of Torah, (Lebanon, NH: Brandeis University Press, 118).
40 Rochelle L. Millen, “Her Mouth is Full of Wisdom,” 43

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About the Authors

**Sohaib Baig** is a fourth year History major. His contribution to this journal is excerpted from his senior thesis, which he wrote under the guidance of Professor Nile Green. Sohaib is fascinated by the politics of knowledge and colonialism, especially when it comes to South Asian Islam; hence, this article perfectly represents his interests. Sohaib won the UCLA Library Prize for upper division research for his senior thesis. He also won first place in the 23rd Annual MLK Oratorical Competition in 2011. He plans to apply for graduate school next year to pursue a PhD in history.

**Zoë Rose Buonaiuto** (zrb) is graduating *summa cum laude* with both a degree in History and in French & Francophone Studies this year. She enjoys Modern European cultural and intellectual history and has a particular interest in Vichy France. Professor Lynn Hunt directed her undergraduate honors thesis, an excerpt of which is published in these pages. Outside of Bunche Hall, Zoë can be found training for her next marathon, reflecting on the meaning of it all, and applying to Ph.D programs for Fall 2013 admission.
Maneesh Karna is a third year Sociology and History double major and Accounting minor who is currently pursuing college, departmental, and Latin honors. Maneesh’s paper was written under the instruction of graduate student Jesse Sadler for lower division seminar, History 97D: Freemasonry, Civil Society, and American Democracy. His research focuses on the dynamic interrelations of U.S. Freemasonry and Christianity; he is particularly interested in examining how Masonic texts challenge Christian Bible. As far as his extracurricular involvements go, Maneesh is the Scholarship Chairman and Vice President Elect of the Beta Alpha Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity and the current president of a UCLA student group, called OX Value Investing. Maneesh’s professional goal is to become a financial analyst and he hopes to continue his hobby of writing fiction on the side.

Ethan Scapellati is a fourth year History and Political Science double major. Ethan conducted the research and writing of his senior thesis (an excerpt of which is included in this journal) under the direction of Professor and History Department Vice Chair Joan Waugh. Ethan's interest has always been grounded in nineteenth century American history, and accordingly, his senior thesis focuses on Civil War soldierhood and it's manifestations during the Gilded Age and the formation of the American nation.
Ethan has been awarded the UCLA Library Prize, the Waingrow Research Scholarship, the UCLA Undergraduate Research Scholars Program Award, and "Scholarly Distinction" from the UCLA Department of History for his thesis. Aside from his research, Ethan works as a Campus Tour Guide for UCLA, has the outgoing President of Model United Nations at UCLA, has interned at the UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations, and directed the 2010 Pre-Law Society at UCLA's Law Forum. Ethan received the 2012 UCLA Distinguished Senior Award for his leadership and involvement throughout his time at UCLA. After graduation, Ethan will work as a fellow in Athens, Greece, teaching English Literature through the Hellenic American Education Foundation Fellowship Program, and will attend law school upon his return.

Benjamin Steiner is a fourth year History major and Jewish Studies minor who is graduating with college and departmental honors, magna cum laude, and Phi Beta Kappa. His contribution to this journal is an excerpt from his senior thesis, which he composed under the guidance of Professor Ellen C. DuBois and dedicates to his twin, Mitzi. In its full incarnation, his work, entitled "Building a Jewish Feminism," plots the evolution of the Jewish feminist conversation from initial 'grumbles and growls' to a more recent, constructive dialogue with the Jewish tradition.
Benjamin is highly involved in several Jewish organizations on campus, including the Jewish Leadership Council and Ha’Am, UCLA’s Jewish newsmagazine. Next year, he will pursue an M.A. in Gender and Women's Studies at the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York.